

UNITED STATES ARMY  
**COMBAT FORCES**

*Journal*

JUNE 1954

50¢

**MAJ. GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN**

pinpoints the essentials of mobility in

*Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses*





The significance of the skiers is that they are the first "buddy platoon" to reach the 1st Cavalry Division at Hokkaido in Japan. These men, trained together since they entered the Army, were sent to the Far East and as a pla-

toon were assigned to Co. I, 8th Cavalry. The 1st CavDiv also has a "Carrier Company"—a full company of infantrymen—officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, that trained together for 19 weeks at Camp Breckinridge, Ky.

Helicopters stay in the news and in action—as in Korea where the 7th Infantry Division in Operation "Red Wing" moved the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry to a forward assembly area just behind the front lines. The air lift was performed by the 13th Transportation Helicopter Company.

(For more on helicopters see page 18.)



## The Month's Pictures

There are no finer pistoleers in the world than these five members of the 1954 United States Army Pistol Squad. Each of these five men wears the Army Distinguished Pistol Badge, the highest award given by the Service for individual prowess with the weapons. *From left to right, front row:* CWO Oscar Weinmeister, M/Sgt Huelet Benner, and CWO Robert Knight. *Standing:* Lt. Col. Ellis Lea and Maj. William Hancock. Col. Lea is team captain and both he and Maj. Hancock also hold the Distinguished Rifle Badge.





*Paratrooper Medical Corpsman on maneuvers administering blood plasma.*

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WESTERN AIR LINES  
WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

# UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT FORCES *Journal*

Vol. 4, No. 11

June 1954

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## Association's Journal

This is the time of year when our Assistant Secretary, in addition to other duties, carries on a wide correspondence with ROTC units throughout the country. Your Association, following through on a project inherited from the *Field Artillery Journal*, provides an Association of the U. S. Army medal to an outstanding cadet at each college-level ROTC unit. There are two medals at present, Infantry and Artillery. When our contest for an Association seal is completed (have you been working on your entry?) the seal will be incorporated into a Branch General medal which will replace the two present ones.

The actual contribution which these medals make to the *esprit de corps* and recognition of outstanding performance of duty can be measured in the attitudes of the PMS&Ts and the cadets alike. No medal is provided unless the PMS&T asks for it—and the requests come thick and fast. Your Association has provided 449 of these medals in the past three years.

Colonel John E. Coleman, former Editor of the *Field Artillery Journal*, donates a one-year subscription to COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL to the medal-winning cadet at Cornell, his *alma mater*. (Other ROTC graduates please copy.)

Presenting these medals without charge is just one more of your Association's little-known services. If you will turn to page 6, you will see that one of our objectives is to: "[perpetuate] those Army and unit traditions that contribute to *esprit de corps* and superior performance of duty." There is ample proof the ROTC medals contribute mightily to this particular objective.

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## COVER

War Dog patrol on truce line in Korea. U.S. Army photo

## THE CURRENT SCENE

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One year \$5.00; two years \$9.00 when paid in advance; three years \$12.00 when paid in advance. Subscriptions for libraries, civilian groups or activities, and others not eligible for membership in the Association of the U. S. Army \$5.00 per year. Foreign subscriptions \$6.00 payable in advance. For other rates write Circulation Manager, Combat Forces Journal, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

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
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
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## AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



**WILDERNESS WINGS**—A damaged light airplane was "rescued" from the frozen surface of Thunder Bay on Lake Superior by a chartered Sikorsky S-55 helicopter, and flown 25 miles to a repair base. Ambank Airlift, Limited, of Ft. William, Ontario, operates the new Canadian charter service, with S-55 equipment exclusively.



**PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT**—This unusual photo shows a Sikorsky H-19 helicopter over the Han River near Seoul in a simulated rescue of a downed pilot. The practice mission by a U.S.A.F. Air Rescue crew was similar to nearly one thousand actual rescues during the Korean war, made on land and at sea behind enemy lines.



**HELICOPTER EXPRESS** — Regularly scheduled Air Express flights in Southern California form a new service started last December by Los Angeles Airways, Inc., and the Air Express division of Railway Express Agency, Inc. Big Sikorsky S-55s, like that above, and S-51s, are used for the speedy shuttle to cities as far inland as San Bernardino.



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### PURPOSES

The Association of the United States Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

### OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to esprit de corps and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

### INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

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VACANCY

## The Month's Mail

### Concentrate on Movement

To the Editors:

In "The Rifle Squad: Key to Movement" (April), Captain Thomas A. Ware, Jr. made a significant contribution to our need for a basic change in squad tactics.

If we are strong on fire superiority and weak on "movement," then we need to concentrate on M. We need a special school to work more effectively on tactics.

ELIJAH CLARENCE ALFORD

Army ROTC

Howard University

Washington, D. C.

### Independent, Ear to the Ground

To the Editors:

The editorial policy of the JOURNAL has been too consistently good over the years to warrant any criticism. But since you say you are puzzled over recent comments of general officers, I'd like to make a few observations.

I believe the solution to your paradox is variety. A balance of both platoon-level combat action material and high-level military thought is needed. Personally, however, I incline toward the former. There's no dearth of high-level thought and theory in official publications, but yours is the only magazine that has made tactics and techniques live for the man on the ground who, in any final analysis, is the one who must get the job done.

It seems to me that those journals that have survived (other than by subsidy) were the ones that refused to toe any party line, that did not rely over-much on official material, that welcomed controversy, and finally reached down to the working level and gave the man on the ground practical solutions to his problems.

Also, there is much to be said for the purely fictional piece in stimulating interest and keeping a magazine alive. Why doesn't the JOURNAL try an occasional "combat story" just for the story's sake, and for the hell of it?

CAPT. AVERY E. KOLB  
USAR

2952 South Columbus St.  
Arlington 6, Va.

### Disagrees With Our Ideals

To the Editors:

I don't believe your magazine is getting the right ideal across.

You believe in too many men in the armed forces. You are helping the Army and the other service to teach out of date training. The armed force isn't teaching H-bomb warfare like it should. Too many officers like the kind that kicked Gen. Billy Mitchell out of the service are still in power. They are too set in their ways and believe that all war will be like World War I and II. They are so set in their ways of old-fashioned training I believe we will get caught with our pants down again. And you as far as I can see in the past and you are still helping them out by letting them write for your JOURNAL.

Also since you will not take a stand on Sen. McCarthy for or against, I again think your JOURNAL is not being fair. I am 100 per cent behind McCarthy and I hope he runs the reds out of the Army and other armed forces.

For the above and many other reasons that I have I shall never again take an COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and any of your other books and magazines.

The above was my own ideals and I mean when I said, I never want to see an COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL again. As you don't like people to disagree with your ideals, I know this will end in the waste paper basket.

APO 40 c/o PM  
San Francisco, Calif.

M. G. NICHOLS



## Disgracing the Uniform

To the Editors:

In regard to making the Army more attractive, let's do something about ex-servicemen who wear parts of their Army uniform with civilian dress. It burns me up to see men disgracing the ones who love the service and who worked for stripes and who fight for the Division insignia that some men insist on wearing just to show off.

What can be done? Give the local civilian authorities in areas where there are no Military Police, the power to apprehend and deal with such persons. Make National Guard officials crack down on their men who wear the uniform improperly. If they like it so much, put them on active duty for twenty-four months.

It's a disgrace to every proud soldier and a dishonor to our buddies who died on the field of honor.

SFC ROBERT S. SIMPSON

17 Westside Court  
Lexington, Va.

## 'Copter Cavalry Now

To the Editors:

The psychological time for "Copter Cavalry" (Major Bert Decker, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL April 1954) is now. We have made our bluff on instant atomic reprisal and it has been called. The battle at Dien Bien Phu hangs in the balance and an

operation no greater than that described by Major Decker would turn the tide. It is very probable that never again will there be an opportunity to gain such a psychological and military advantage with so small an expenditure.

Many more helicopters than have been mentioned are dispersed through the armed forces. They could be flown to Indochina and be ready for action probably within a week. They would still be able to continue operating after the monsoons have rendered all other means of transportation impossible. A decisive outcome would place overwhelming strength in Mr. Dulles' hands. As far as we know, the Russians cannot strike back in any comparable manner so that this form of instant retaliation is less likely to provoke a general war than any other that might be suggested.

DAVID C. PRINCE

50 Washington Ave.  
Schenectady, N. Y.


## Why They're Generals

To the Editors:

I read with interest your column "JOURNAL's Journal" in the April issue and was not surprised to learn that practically every general reads the JOURNAL, which is merely another reason why they are generals.

Better JOURNAL, more members, better JOURNAL. Sure must have a lot of members.

I know of no place where the JOURNAL is more valuable than in a training divi-



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
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sion. It is in a training division that most potential members are, and once a member always a member.

The Commanding General of the 6th Infantry Division at Fort Ord has the right idea in this respect. Information pertaining to the Association of the United States Army was included in the orientation of

the newly arrived officer. No pressure is required. All that is necessary is to have a few subscription cards handy, a few copies of the JOURNAL located in the place of reception, and then tell them what it is all about. Nothing to it.

I'll bet my whiskey ration card that the 6th Division is leading the rest of the training divisions in membership.

Back issues of the JOURNAL make the best reference library a military-minded officer or noncommissioned officer can possess, whether he be in staff or command, in Infantry or QMC. Some officers I know refer to the JOURNAL oftener than they do FM's and TM's.

A captain was gathering material for a course of instruction he was to give on infantry tactics. He had FM's and pamphlets all over the place. It would have taken him days to get the stuff he wanted to fit the group he was preparing to instruct, had it not been for a friend who informed him of

the article "Stress the Fundamentals" which appeared in the JOURNAL several months ago. That was all he needed. It is much easier to read and absorb something written by someone who gives you that feeling of confidence in knowing he knows what he is writing about, than it is to read and retain something written by an obscure author. A lieutenant was required to submit a paper on "NCO Prestige" for TI&E. Being a member, this required no sweat. He submitted a good letter based on ideas and suggestions contained in "The Month's Mail." A few months ago an officer was required to give a lecture on security. He found a good article in Cerebrations.

Many officers are doing the same. In the JOURNAL can be found something on any military subject.

As a suggestion, I recommend a list of the training divisions be published, in order of standing in number of members of the Association. I believe this would inspire some members located in such divisions to get on the stick and guide their unfortunate fellow officers into the realm of the wise. I mention training divisions because of the rapid turnover.

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
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
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
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


## WORLD TRAVELER




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# Front And Center

The New Look's emphasis on air and naval power began to lose much of its luster during the last week in April as the news from Dien Bien Phu began to make it crystal clear that if the U.S. was to intervene in Indochina it would have to be with ground combat troops and if it intended to go to the rescue of Dien Bien Phu it would have to be with airborne forces (and the U.S. has only two airborne divisions and one airborne RCT). The situation in Indochina is such that even though the U.S. does not intervene, it still would appear that the reduction in the strength of our land combat forces in the Far East is no longer advisable. That was another of the goals of the New Look; designed to reduce Army strength and to create a strategic reserve in the U.S. The New Look appears more and more to be in the position of the dreamer who was finally convinced that he faced a condition and not a theory. The theory of massive retaliation and a smaller defense budget was attractive. Dien Bien Phu, actually, and as it symbolizes the fact that Communist aggression can be stopped only by ground combat forces, is a condition; a reality that has to be faced.

Battlefield surveillance problems and techniques are under study by the University of Michigan for the Army. Among the methods being studied are radar, infrared techniques, battlefield illumination, seismic and acoustical devices.

The Army is urging all of its commanders to get full use from the Army aviation assigned to its commands. It has noted that in some instances aircraft have not been used to the full extent possible and in other instances Army aviators have not been able to maintain and increase their flying efficiency. The Army training program for aviators stresses flying proficiency. Aviators assigned to tactical units are urged to practice the landing and take-off from short runways, and aviators assigned to utility and command aircraft are urged to increase their proficiency in instrument flying. Commanders are urged to get full use from aviation assigned them and to report if they have aviation in excess of their needs.

About \$1.3 billion will be spent on military research and development in the

## Report on Flash Burn

An early report from Exercise Flash Burn by Hanson W. Baldwin in *The New York Times* provides interesting comment on some of the tactical methods and techniques tried out during the North Carolina war games. Some of Mr. Baldwin's observations:

- ▶ There is need for improved methods of identifying drop zones so that troop-carrier pilots can bring their planes over the proper point at the proper altitude at the proper time. There is also a need for more drop zones in atomic warfare; a separate drop zone for each battalion would avoid massing and concentration. Flight formations are too large. More assault type aircraft are needed.
- ▶ Command relationships between the Air Force and Army are still not satisfactory, in the Army's view.
- ▶ Army assault helicopter tactics are not as advanced as those of the Marine Corps. Part of the trouble is the divided responsibility between the Army and Air Force.
- ▶ The eleven-man squad with two BARs and the shift of some of the arms of the heavy-weapons company to rifle companies was generally approved by those who watched the maneuvers.
- ▶ Tactical television has tremendous possibilities, and its development should be pushed.
- ▶ Methods of identifying an atomic target adequately and promptly must be improved by both the Army and Air Force. The time lag between the call for an atomic strike and its execution is too great.
- ▶ Camouflage and concealment and the siting of positions were inadequate.
- ▶ Defense against chemical, biological and atomic attack was inadequate in both practice and theory.
- ▶ Supply and logistics were well executed.
- ▶ Morale was high and the training achieved was excellent.

fiscal year ending this month. This is about two and a half times the amount spent in the years preceding 1950. Altogether, research and development for military purposes costs about \$2 billion

a year and is about half of the total national outlay for research and development. The military R&D budget for the coming fiscal year will be about seven per cent less than the budget for last year. The Army's portion of this reduction is larger than the other services'.

Implementation of the Army's reorganization report (*COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*, February 1954) isn't proceeding very fast. For one thing, Secretary Stevens hasn't been able to apply himself to it because of the Senate investigation. But more significant is the lack of acceptance of the report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. One DOD objection is the recommendation that the Comptroller be a military officer rather than a civilian. In contrast to the difficulties experienced by the Army report is the support and public praise the Secretary of Defense gave to the Navy report. The Navy report provides for a civilian comptroller. The report was prepared by a committee composed of Navy officers and civilian officials of the Navy Department. The Army report was prepared by a civilian committee.

The Air Force is still having trouble dropping paratroopers on the proper drop zones, a difficulty that was costly in lives in World War II operations. The Air Force has taken over the pathfinder jobs from the Army and uses what it calls "combat control teams." However, their techniques are still less than perfect. A different method, one that uses a device that calculates in flight the exact moment the pilot should signal the paratroopers to jump, has been perfected by the Royal Canadian Air Force.

A permanent promotion law for Reserve officers appears rather dim in view of the statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hannah that such a law should await implementation of an improved reserve program. The catch is that early legislation to strengthen the reserve structure isn't very promising at the moment. Progress depends upon the report Dr. Arthur S. Flemming makes to the President on the reserves. But Dr. Flemming has been waiting for a report by a military committee of senior officers who were asked to prepare a plan for the reserves. That report, due 1 April, hadn't been made on 1 May.




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Breaking up and loading old asphalt is a punishing job that demands the strength of the world's largest Tractor Shovel. Here the Allis-Chalmers HD-20G rips up an old air strip and loads the rubble into hauling units.



# ALLIS-CHALMERS

TRACTOR DIVISION - MILWAUKEE 1, U. S. A.

# DESIGN FOR AN ATOMIC ARMY

The Army's contribution to the new strategy must be the creation of "in being" forces that are completely air transportable and capable of seizing and holding key areas in the enemy's homeland

## COLONEL GEORGE B. SLOAN

FROM the time of our national beginnings our country has relied on our *potential* military strength, not our immediately available forces, to deter or defeat aggressors. But that is no more, if we accept the pronouncements of various influential spokesmen. We now rely upon immediate massive retaliation by forces in being. We shall—it is implied—destroy the aggressor's cities, burn his factories, kill millions of his people and maim or shock into helplessness millions of others. We are to imagine that within a short period after the enemy begins a war, his homeland will be a scene of ruin and disorder, his government inoperative, his transportation system at a standstill and his communications disrupted. This crushing attack will be executed by strategic air and naval forces. The Army has no part in it and no responsibility for it. Such complete isolation of the Army from all connection with the nation's primary strategic program has caused some people to ponder the question of whether we are justified in maintaining an active army.

If it were certain, or even likely, that the strategic air efforts would produce a decision, cause our enemy to surrender, and achieve our nation's war objectives, there would indeed be no justification for an active army. Unfortunately, however, there is lack of convincing evidence that the strategic air offensive will produce these results. That it will create paralyzing destruction is almost certain. But if history has any lesson for the military student, no single fact is more amply demonstrated than that bombardment alone—regardless of its intensity—is never conclusive. The inability of air power to close with the enemy and force a decision means that the most that can be expected of this air offensive is a stalemate; the enemy will be prostrate but not lifeless, and we will not have the means to administer the final, decisive blows. We will not have the means precisely because the Army is not a partner to the strategy.

It is here that the Army will be needed to win a decisive victory. Closing with the enemy and completing

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COLONEL GEORGE B. SLOAN, Infantry, is a 1937 graduate of the Military Academy and a 1953 graduate of the Army War College. During the Second World War he served in the Aleutians with the 37th Infantry and on Kwajalein with the 7th Infantry Division. He then went to Europe where he was G3 of the XIX Corps. During the Korean conflict he commanded the 27th Infantry and was later Chief of Plans, G3 Section, Eighth Army. He is now on duty in the Pentagon.



## Fast-moving, hard-hitting task forces that follow up atomic counterblows

his subjugation is the Army's business. The problem is to make it clear to all that this business is necessary. When it is understood that only the Army can close with the enemy and insure his defeat, the existence of the Army will be assured. Can our present Army do this job? Well, let's see.

At the end of sixty or one hundred days, or whatever time the strategic air and naval forces require to deliver their "massive blows of retaliation," the Army, according to present plans for a phase build-up, will have ordered to active duty five to ten National Guard divisions and will have activated perhaps five more. (These are my estimates; I wrote this without reference to mobilization plans.) It will have accomplished about fifteen per cent of its mobilization and will still be twenty months away from completing the build-up of forces considered necessary to launch an invasion of the enemy's homeland. These divisions will be similar to World War II units, and except for the addition of a few battalions of atomic cannons, free and guided missiles, the field army itself will have changed little since World War II or Korea.

**D**URING those sixty days the Army staff will be up to its neck in inducting, training, feeding and caring for millions of new citizen soldiers. It will be heavily involved in trying to salvage some good from a number of rear guard actions scattered around the world. It will be beset by investigators, harassed by shortages and burdened by an excess of advice. In short, mobilization will be in full swing—but the Army will be totally unable and unprepared to capitalize on the effect of the atomic offensive. While the slow, agonizing process of mobilization grinds away, the golden opportunity for a quick victory will escape. The shock of our massive nuclear blows will dissipate, the opportunity for full exploitation will disappear. Just as surely as infantry must "lean against an artillery barrage" to reap its full value so must the Army be prepared immediately to invade the enemy's homeland following the thermonuclear offensive. Only in this way can the full benefits of our tremendously expensive atomic offensive be realized.

"All true," says the Army planner, "but so what? It is a regrettable but incontrovertible fact that we cannot maintain an army in being of sufficient size to invade the enemy's homeland. The best we can do is maintain the nucleus—or base. The unhappy reality of mobilization is something that will forever haunt us."

Is this actually true? Suppose we abandoned our preconceived ideas. Suppose we junked the mobilization concept and all its subsidiary plans; suppose we forgot about our present organization and branches, about our

experience, about World Wars I and II, about Korea and about the Louisiana maneuvers in 1940. Suppose everybody agreed to put his private prejudices, biases and partialities in cold storage. Suppose we did all this and then set out to design an army capable of invading an aggressor's homeland immediately following our atomic counterblow. What would such an army look like?



**F**IRST, when and how should this Army fight? Obviously, if it is to exploit the thermonuclear offensive it must be capable of moving directly to the scene of destruction and coping with the situation it finds there. To do this, our Army must be organized into task forces, capable of rapid independent movement to selected strategic areas and prepared on arrival to seize and maintain control of these areas.

These attacks must be initiated immediately after the strategic air offensive. The simultaneous capture of the key areas will provide the finishing blow of the war by preventing the enemy from recovering from the shock of thermonuclear disaster. Sooner or later—probably sooner—it will force his surrender. If on D-day the Soviets begin the war by launching their own strategic air offensive, and by setting off invasions of Western Europe, the Near East and Japan, we must at once counterattack with a devastating atomic offensive. In a few weeks hundreds of high-yield bombs rain on the Soviet's cities and installations. At the end of—say 100 days—her cities are in ruins, transportation at a standstill. Her armies on her perimeter are held in check by our Allies, by tactical thermonuclear weapons and by a shortage of supplies. Beginning at about that time, corps-size task forces descend on fifteen or twenty key points, capture these localities and extend their control progressively toward each other. By quickly overrunning the disorganized local defenders, capitalizing on the latent hatred for Communist tyranny and converting to our own advantage the nationalism of various racial minorities, this relatively small force should be able rapidly to extend its control over all of the enemy country.

**W**HAT kind of organization must we have to be capable of mounting a dozen or more independent long-range invasions of the enemy's homeland? Briefly, the Army should have the following characteristics:

- Complete and true air transportability
- Independence of land lines of communication
- A high degree of tactical mobility and fire power
- By World War II standards small tactical units: perhaps 50 divisions of 10,000 man strength—and a total active strength of around a million.

"A pipe dream," says your veteran Army planner.



## An army in being and ready to fight, rather than one geared to mobilize later

"How are you going to get fifty divisions out of one million men when today we can't get twenty divisions out of a million and a half? How are you going to make a division truly air transportable when the plane doesn't exist that will fly an M-48 tank? Even if you could lift your heavy equipment, you still couldn't begin to transport and supply fifty divisions by air transport alone. There aren't enough airplanes in the world for that. Also, how could a small, independent task force of thirty or forty thousand men sustain itself in the heart of an enemy's homeland? And while all this is going on, what will the Soviet Army be doing? Your strategic air blows won't stop it, because it has stockpiled supplies to keep going for a long time. Worst of all—you are putting all your eggs in one basket. What will you do if the Strategic Air Force doesn't get off the ground, or if the country is forced to revise its strategy?" These, of course, are but a few of the objections that will be expressed, but since they are among the most important, let's examine them. The fellow who expressed them, incidentally, is still thinking in terms of the mobilization concept, of linear ground warfare, of land lines of communication and of TNT rather than TN (thermonuclear). These were valid concepts in their day, but they are not compatible with the realities of atomic warfare.

**H**OW can we get fifty divisions out of a million men? Two ways—by streamlining the division and by cutting down the non-divisional overhead. As it stands today, the Army is admittedly an inefficient fighting force, organized as the nucleus for an expanded army—not at one intended to fight as it stands. Large portions of its strength, funds and energy are devoted to maintaining a mobilization base and a massive reserve. But if we accept the idea—as the Air Force and the Navy have—of fighting with forces in being, these programs may be dropped or curtailed. We will no longer maintain a mobilization base. The long overdue reorganization of logistical services can be effected, and these services, having before them for the first time the clearly defined mission of supporting a fighting force of a definite size, can effect tremendous savings within themselves. In a similar manner, the Army's training base may be streamlined and tailored for a specific job. The reserve program will be limited to D-day ready units, with some of the units assuming a greater or even total responsibility for anti-aircraft and other continental defense programs. The present plan to reduce the active Army's border guard duties in Korea, Japan and Europe can be accelerated, and the mission of containing the Communist land forces turned over to our allies, assisted by our tactical atomic weapons. All these steps

will enable the Army to devote a far greater proportion of its assets to its strategic force. Perhaps more than half its total strength will be allotted to combat-ready fighting forces.

Within the field Army itself, even greater savings may be effected. Today the type—or typical—field army contains more artillery battalions than infantry battalions, approximately as many engineers as tankers. This tremendous proportion of total strength devoted to artillery derives from our world wars concept of massed artillery fires. That this was a sound concept is indisputable, but equally evident is the fact that it has been outmoded by tactical atomic weapons. In World War II the ability to mass the fires of twenty or more artillery battalions at any given point was a first factor in our successes. But today the same and even greater effect can be obtained by any one of several atomic weapons, and these weapons require a minute fraction of the men and matériel required by World War II artillery. It seems evident, therefore, that if we abandon the idea of indirect fire TNT weapons and accept the principle of relying entirely on tactical atomic weapons for area saturation purposes, we will have increased by almost fifty per cent the number of divisions within the field army.

**T**HE efficiency, versatility and importance of our engineer units in the Army is widely acknowledged. Their vital role in maintaining our land lines of communication cannot be exaggerated. But if we become independent of land lines of communication, much of their now vital work need not be done and a great deal of their strength will be available for other purposes. In fact, independence of land LOCs should permit the revision of the entire science of field logistics, with perhaps a single base section providing direct logistical support via air lanes to all of the various task groups in the field. Such a program offers tremendous possibilities for conserving manpower.

Thus, by reorganizing the army as a whole, based on a concept of fighting the war with forces in being as opposed to a concept of mobilization, and by reorganizing the field army to obtain maximum advantage of thermonuclear weapons and air transport, sufficient manpower savings may be effected to permit the organization of perhaps fifty 10,000 man divisions. It is entirely possible that this will give us the power to carry out the strategic missions I have outlined. It will permit the formation of fifteen to twenty task forces of 20,000 to 30,000 men. Roughly, this appears to be about the proper number, although the determination of the precise number must, of course, be worked out in detailed plans. In any event, fifty divisions available on D-day will be of greater strategic value than two or



## A truly air transportable task force will sacrifice weight of armor for mobility

three times that number on D plus thirty-six months.

**N**EXT, the matter of making a division truly air transportable. The first step in this process we have already discussed—the substitution of tactical atomic missiles for the bulk of conventional artillery. This step will not only greatly reduce the size of the division but it will more than halve the tonnage necessary to sustain it. The second step involves redesign of the tank. Our present tank is so heavy—and its fuel requirements are so great—that it simply cannot be fitted into the airborne picture. But need the tank be so heavy? Must it consume more than a gallon of fuel per mile? A large number of men, within the armor arm, say no. They point out that a tank has three essential characteristics: mobility, fire power and armor or protection. The ideal tank embodies all three of these characteristics and if it were practical to have an air-transported tank similar to the M-48, then there would be no reason to redesign the tank. Unfortunately the problem of air transporting large numbers of M-48 tanks seems insolvable. If we are to have a tank in the air-transported Army, we must lessen its weight. Accordingly, let us cut down on the armor, but retaining its mobility and fire power. These are the characteristics which account for the tank's killing power, its shock action and its psychological effect. By sacrificing armor we are enabled to put a tank with great fighting power on the battlefield of our choice. Several practical suggestions toward this end have been made. One is laminated nylon armor. Another advocates acquiring armor at the battle area itself. This would be done by providing the vertical surfaces of the tank with pockets—and, after air movement to the combat zone, filling these pockets with local aggregate (sand and gravel to you and me). Either of these measures would make it possible to fly tanks to the battlefield—tanks that would retain considerable protection against small arms and shell fragments. Development of a tank combining mobility, fighting power and low weight is both practical and imperative.

This tank should be the basis of the strategic division, which would consist of three or more tank-infantry regiments, an atomic weapons battalion and a service support battalion. This division would be truly air transportable and it probably would require not more than half the airlift of the present infantry division.

**C**AN we maintain an army such as this in the field? Our present division is said to require about 560 tons of supplies per day of active combat. Of this total, 400 tons are ammunition, 70 tons are POL, 48 tons are rations and the balance other types of supply. Artillery accounts for about 80 per cent of the ammunition expenditures. Thus, elimination of the bulk of conventional artillery reduces tonnage requirements by about 300 tons daily. Reduction in the over-all size of the division cuts the consumption of supplies other than ammunition about 40 per cent. The total daily requirements of the new division, therefore, may be estimated at about 200 tons

—or an amount sufficient to provide full loads for 20 aircraft capable of lifting 10 tons each. Assume the average penetration distance is about 1,200 miles. Because this distance is near the extreme radius of modern transport aircraft, allow two aircraft for each daily plane load of supplies required. Total aircraft requirement necessary to support 50 divisions does not exceed 2,000, certainly a modest figure for a nation of our air transport capability.

**T**HE fourth objection is that a force of the proposed size and composition could not survive in the heart of the enemy's homeland. It is true that one such force—acting alone—could not survive. But the total impact of ten, fifteen or twenty of these task units, acting as an integral part of the grand strategic force, will be far greater than the sum of their individual effects. These units will descend upon a demoralized and prostrate land. The capture of all the enemy's key strategic areas, coupled with the disruption of his transportation system, the destruction of his petroleum stocks and the impotence of his government, will deny him the capability of concentrating large forces. This strategy does not visualize that the ground forces will fight with impunity. Some losses will be inevitable. But the strategy does hold the hope of great gain for small loss.

**A**S for the enemy armies, it is reasonably certain that when the war starts, the enemy will set its armies in motion toward such tempting objectives as Western Europe, the Near East and Japan. These invasions must be contained by our Allies, assisted by our air power and tactical atomic weapons. As our strategic air offensive unfolds, the Soviets will find that they cannot disengage their invading armies and return them to the interior of Russia for defense of the homeland. Pressure from our allies, disruption of transportation, attacks against petroleum and other vital stocks, all will serve to immobilize the bulk of Soviet armies near the frontiers. Meanwhile, at the proper time, our strategic army will deliver an assault directly on the enemy's heartland, by-passing the isolated armies along the perimeter. This is true vertical envelopment in the strategic sense.

**F**INALLY, consider the objection that the plan is inflexible, that we are committed to a single strategy, incapable of adjusting ourselves to a set of circumstances at variance with those we have predicted. It is true, of course, that the early invasion of the enemy's strategic centers presupposes the success of the strategic air attack. If SAC doesn't get off the ground—if the "massive blows of retaliation" are never delivered, then there will be no early airborne invasion of the homeland. But this in itself is not an indictment of the concept of a combat-ready army. As a matter of fact, if, for any reason, the strategic air force is withheld or prevented from executing its mission of strategic bombardment, the existence of a strategically mobile combat-ready army becomes

## Organize the Army so it can move into the enemy's land and force a decision

even more desirable. By the same token, failing the SAC offensive, the chances of our present mobilization plan attaining fruition are highly speculative.

What does this all add up to? Let's return to the basic strategy: For the first time in the life of our Republic, we have changed our basic strategy of defense. We will defend our country with forces in being rather than depending upon mobilization after the start of war.

Primary responsibility for executing this strategy is vested in air and naval forces, but because these forces are unable to move into the enemy's heartland and force our will upon him, the strategy is indecisive and holds little hope for more than a stalemate. The Army has no part in this immediate retaliation plan, not because it isn't needed, but rather because the Army, in its present form, is not prepared to carry out its traditional mission of occupation and subjugation.

It is possible to organize our Army (no greater in size than our present force) so that it will be capable of joining the Air Force and Navy in achieving the decisive defeat of an aggressor. Such an Army would have as its basis the acceptance of the concept of fighting the war with forces in being. To make it possible, it will be necessary to reorganize the logistical force; transfer to D-day ready units of the reserve forces greater responsibility for continental defense, including antiaircraft; depend upon our allies, reinforced with U.S. tactical atomic weapons, for border guard duties in Western Europe, the 38th Parallel and similar areas; and organize the active field army into a strategic force—to be known as the Strategic Army—capable of mounting airborne attacks simultaneously or in rapid succession on the enemy's key strategic

areas immediately following the strategic air offensive.


This Army will have the following characteristics:

- Complete air transportability.
- High degree of tactical mobility and fire power.
- Independence of land lines of communication.


These characteristics may be built into the Army by depending upon tactical atomic weapons for area saturation fires with the elimination of the bulk of conventional artillery; eliminating the forces connected with establishing, maintaining and operating land lines of communication; and redesigning the division based upon an air transportable tank.

These measures will remove from the country's new strategy the defect of indecisiveness. They will restore the Army to a dynamic role, essential not only for the security of the nation but for the health of the Army itself, and they will complete the transformation of the armed forces which began with the flight of the first plane at Kitty Hawk and gathered speed with the birth of the atomic age at Alamogordo.

I AM not so naïve as to believe that I have turned out in finished form a blueprint for a new army. Whatever changes are made will be the work of many minds and great labor. But I do fervently believe that the Army must free itself of the horse-and-buggy concepts of mobilization, linear warfare, conventional artillery, and dependence upon land LOCs. We must get in step with the other services, accept the new strategy and learn to live with it and contribute to it. That is our task. Let's get on with it.







## Five Whirly-birds Lift 105 Section

The technique of air-lifting a 105mm howitzer and its 10-man crew by five H-19 helicopters described here gives medium artillery the capability of displacing rapidly. Limitations imposed by the absence of roads or the presence of impassable terrain or bodies of water are overcome by the use of helicopter lift. In Korea, for example, the 69th ROK Field Artillery Battalion was airlifted to new positions in a long, narrow and deep valley that was inaccessible by road and cut off at the open end of the valley by a reservoir.

The actual displacement of an artillery unit by helicopter requires a definite sequence. First the new site must be reconnoitered and an advance party sent in to prepare it. The advance party marks the site with predesignated code letters to show the pilots where to set down their loads.

The actual movement of a gun section begins with the disassembly of the howitzer. This can be done in 15 minutes (reassembly takes 20). The disassembly requires the removal of the breech mechanism, tube, recoil mechanism, traversing swivel, nut bracket cap, front seat of the equilibrator, pintle pin, top carriage, main shields (left behind to lessen weight), and the wheels.

The parts are assembled into three loads, as pictured in the pages that follow.

The flight is made in two echelons. The first echelon consists of Loads Nos. 1 and 4 because they carry the axle and wheels.


The second echelon lands at about the time the wheels are installed.

### Special Equipment . . . . .


Buckles, flexible lashing, and 1-inch steel rings one foot in diameter



Sling and hook assembly: to attach all external loads to the 'copter



Cargo nets: for the movement of ammunition and supplies





## Disassembly . . . . .



Removal of the pintle pin. It takes a nice touch to get the pin key recessed when re-assembling



The 10-man crew must be on the job when the barrel assembly is lifted from the how. If timber carrying bars aren't available strong tree limbs or saplings can be used

## Load No. 1 . . . . . 1,480 lbs.

Axle, equalizing support, pintle pin, trails and lifting bar

Trails and axle rigged for hook-up.  
Note traversing wheel and pintle



Load No. 1 is airborne. One lifting bar is also attached.



## Load No. 2 . . . . . 979 lbs.

Barrel and breech assembly

Barrel assembly rigged for hook-up



Load No. 2 in flight



Loads 3, 4 and 5



## Load No. 3 . . . . . 1530 lbs.

Cradle, recoil mechanism, equilibrator, top carriage, auxiliary shields, sight mounts and lifting bar



Four men carry the recoil mechanism



Cradle, recoil mechanism, equilibrators, top carriage, auxiliary shields, sight mounts and one lifting bar (serving as an outrigger) are assembled for the third load

## Loads Nos. 4 & 5 . . . . . 10-man crew

Load 4: Four crew members and wheels

The two wheels are carried in 'copter that also carries four of the crew



Load 5: Six men, breech block and tools

Breech block and tools are carried in 'copter lifting remaining men



In moving a battery five H-19s are assigned to carry each of the first five howitzer sections. Experience has shown that it is advisable to have the section truck driver stay with his vehicle and have one man from the sixth section replace him. Thus by the time the first five sections are in, most of the crew of the last section are on the new site and only four 'copters are needed to move it. Experience has also shown that it is wise to bring in the chief of the first section to be flown with the advance party and have the other chiefs of sections come in with the sections preceding their own. This permits a chief to be on the ground early enough to locate the scheduled position of his piece and to guide the 'copters carrying his piece and crew.

Reassembly can be rapid. Efficiency is obtained by having each member of each section assigned definite duties.

The rear echelon remaining behind maintains a continuous flow of ammunition and other supplies to the battery either by helicopter lift or by truck when and if roads are opened.

The H-13 which flew in the advance party returns to the battalion, laying wire as it flies. Five ½-mile wire dispensers can be hooked together and placed in a container which is fastened to the left skid of the H-13. The H-13 can also be used to fly an observer to a vantage point, laying wire as it flies, thus giving the observer immediate communication with the battery.

When an outfit sets out to "restore prestige" some painful surprises are in store; for the way back is a

## LONG AND ROCKY ROAD

MASTER SERGEANT THOMAS C. GORDON

THERE has been a lot of talk about restoring the prestige of officers and non-commissioned officers. I don't know how many outfits have undertaken the long road back. But I do know what has been done by the 33d Infantry under the leadership of Colonel A. G. Elegar.

"Return of prestige" and other such phrases are easy to say and sound fine. But my observation is that the road back is rocky indeed. It is heartbreaking work and if you engage in it you can expect to be shocked at times.

We in the 33d found that when initiative was given noncommissioned officers, some of them fell painfully short of accepting and exercising it and had to be relieved. We learned that some of today's noncoms cannot assume the responsibilities of noncoms of twenty years ago. I do not mean that there were wholesale reductions within our battalions—not at all. There were, however, more reductions among the top three grades than you would normally expect. When company officers found themselves with the responsibilities that had been handled by field grade officers they learned that they had to lean more and more on their noncoms. When a noncom crumpled under the burden, room had to be made for a man who could handle the job. It was as simple as that. And as difficult.

Why were there as many as there were who could not handle the job? That is a hard one. In all fairness you can't lay all the blame on command practices of World War II. Korea must take some share of the blame. And other things, too.

I think the best way to describe the situation is to use the example of a man I shall call Master Sergeant Blank. Blank had been in the Army for eight years when he was rotated from a combat unit in Korea to the 33d Infantry. Before he went to Korea Blank had been a corporal, but in Korea he was jumped to master sergeant. I do not mean to detract from Blank's combat record but the truth is the jump was too fast for Blank. Blank failed the 33d,

particularly in leadership essentials.

A reclassification board found it necessary to recommend his reduction to E-5 and a transfer to another unit within the regiment. He recovered from the initial shock and is now doing well. In a year or so, he will qualify under 33d Infantry standards for consideration for promotion to E-6. Blank can't be blamed for all this; he was the victim of circumstance.

THERE was one other headache that should be mentioned. "Prestige is as prestige does," and we had to scrap to keep prestige sacred if we were to have it at all. The problem of fraternization between noncoms and privates had to be



The 33d's motto—*Smiling We Come*—is a good one for an outfit with the high spirits of "restored" prestige

met head-on and without quarter. Noncoms had to be thoroughly briefed (a continuing affair involving newly promoted NCOs) on the fact that noncoms are only as good as their conduct on and off duty. Military police reports and other incidents of misconduct could not and would not be tolerated. As usual there were those who challenged this, either through forgetfulness or perversity. Those that did fell by the wayside.

We had other methods to pave the way for the return of prestige. Some of these are:

- Privates and privates 1st class (including acting corporals) were excluded from the Noncommissioned Officers

Club. Former practice had allowed them the use of the club on certain nights.

- The practice of requiring the top three graders to show their passes when they were entering or leaving the post in uniform was abolished.

- Top three graders were given off-duty passes good for all hours. They retained these in their possession.

- The establishment of sergeants' messes at each unit mess hall with table service.

- The establishment of a board of non-commissioned officers consisting of the senior noncoms of the regiment to advise the commanding officer at his request. This board is working on a plan for a workable method of selecting qualified men for promotion to the top three grades. This includes testing and maintenance of eligibility lists on a regiment-wide basis.

- The establishment of promotion boards consisting of three or more senior NCOs in each company, to make recommendations to the unit commander for promotions and/or reductions in the grades of PFC and corporal.

- The return of the First Sergeants' Call, conducted by the sergeant major, and the elimination of needless "command-line" paper work.

- The reduction of the number of courts-martial cases involving disrespect or insubordination to noncoms by the NCO handling less severe cases himself. Cases that do come up receive punishments.

- The sergeant major acts as a member of the commanding officer's staff during reviews and certain inspections.

THESE and many other changes have seen a definite rise in the morale of the lower ranks. At first, and it can be well understood, there was a sharp increase in incidents of disrespect to noncommissioned officers. Some privates and privates first class could not accept the change and fought it tooth and nail. A few had to learn the hard way. Eventually, though, education and patience paid off and it was satisfying to see the pendulum swing back.



# **CAVALRY, And I Don't Mean Horses**

**MAJOR GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN**

**S**OME measure of undying fame was achieved by "Fighting Joe" Hooker in the War Between the States, when he asked, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" From a war in which catch phrases were common, this one has been well remembered among the military; but it is a trifle lengthy for the soldiers of today. They are more likely to ask, "Who ever saw cavalry?"

Today it is the pastime of soldier-historians to speculate about the use of cavalry in that most bloody of all our national conflicts. What would have happened if Jeb Stuart, instead of wagon hunting, had been roving ahead of Lee when he debouched from the Cashtown pass on Gettysburg? If Buford on Will-

oughby Run had been driven in by the full impact of Stuart's incomparable cavalry, and the heights east and south of Gettysburg had been seized by the Southerners that first day, what effect would it have had on the hesitant Meade? Perhaps the whole course of our history would have changed. Perhaps.

In the meantime, we have fought a few more wars. Recently we reached a stalemate in one of them that historians may judge the most costly and least successful of all. In it, time after time, we committed our forces blindly to battle. While some historians are still lamenting the absence of Stuart at Gettysburg, no one has asked, "Where was Walker's cavalry in Korea?"—and it is high time



One of the pioneers in the search for mobility that brought the airman and the soldier together, Major General James M. Gavin was a first lieutenant when he reported to the jump school at Fort Benning in August 1941. A little more than three years later he was a major general with a world-wide reputation as a fighting soldier and superb combat leader. After the war he wrote *Airborne Warfare*, published by



General Gavin in Europe during World War II

the then Infantry Journal Press, and revealed himself as a man with an imaginative and searching mind. He recently left command of V Corps in Europe and is now Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Department of the Army.

This article first appeared in the April 1954 issue of *Harper's Magazine*. It is reprinted here by permission. Copyright, 1954, Harper & Brothers.

that someone did. Where was Walker's cavalry on November 26, 1950, when his handful of divisions was struck with complete and overwhelming surprise by thirty Chinese divisions? Unit after unit stumbled into ambush and suffered the worst defeat in the history of American arms.

Where was the cavalry? It was, and still is, in the minds of military planners and historians. And I don't mean horses. I mean helicopters and light aircraft, to lift soldiers armed with automatic weapons and hand-carried antitank weapons, and also lightweight reconnaissance vehicles, mounting antitank weapons the equal (or better) of the Russian T-34s.

Technologically we could have had them. Because of our deification of heavy equipment—and the combat practices of late World War II, which deluded us into believing that heavy armor is cavalry—we didn't have them. We lost the cavalry when we mounted it in weighty tanks and trucks, all of which move (if the terrain will allow them to move at all) at exactly the same speed as motorized infantry, if not slower.

**C**AVALRY is supposed to be the arm of mobility. It exists and serves a useful purpose because of its mobility differential—the contrast between its mobility and that of other land forces. Without the differential it is *not* cavalry. Cavalry is the arm of shock and firepower; it is the screen of time and information. It denies the enemy that talisman of success—surprise—while it provides our own forces with the means to achieve that very thing, surprise, and with it destruction of the enemy.

Cavalry is not a horse, nor the crossed sabers and yellow scarves. These are the vestigial trappings of a gallant great arm of the U. S. Army, whose soul has been traded for a body. It is the arm of Jeb Stuart, and Custer, and Sheridan, and

Forrest. It is the arm that as late as World War II got there (in Forrest's phrase) the "fustest with the mostest," but is now rapidly becoming, in terms of firepower and mobility, lastest with the leastest. Certainly gallantry, venturesomeness, and willingness to die are abundant in our armored and cavalry units, as they have amply demonstrated at every combat opportunity. But with the motorization of the land forces, and the consequent removal of the mobility differential, the cavalry has ceased to exist in our Army except in name.

**I**N June 1950, when the victory-intoxicated North Korean forces were surging southward from the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur asked and was given authority to get in the ground battle. Obviously, the tactical situation called for a cavalry force to be committed at once, to screen and delay, while the heavier infantry and armored forces built up a more substantial defense.

What did we have that was equal to the occasion? One small infantry command of two-plus rifle companies and a battery of artillery, lifted to Korea by Air Force transport. Once under fire, they were slowed down to the speed of a foot soldier—actually slower than many of the tank-mounted North Koreans. They never had the proper means or mobility to perform their cavalry mission.

As Walker fell back, trading his infantry and artillery for time, his flanks were wide open. On his left, particularly, a gap of a hundred miles extending to the sea could readily have been penetrated. The situation begged for cavalry, but we lacked the contemporary kind of cavalry to do the job. As General Walker's forces fell back to the constricted perimeter about Pusan, only the valiant efforts of his fire-brigade infantrymen and their comrades of the Tactical Air Force made it possible to hold on.

Finally, when the landings at Inchon took place on September 15, there was again every promise of fluid action. I was present at Inchon, and after the first



crust of resistance was broken it seemed to me there was nothing worthy of the name in front of X Corps. The situation screamed for highly mobile cavalry forces to exploit this unprecedented opening. We should have pressed south to the rear of the Nakdong River line in hours. Instead, we took almost two weeks to establish a link between these two forces. When the first breakout of our forces from the southern perimeter moved northward, it was a combined tank-truck column, essentially an infantry column limited in its performance by its road-bound equipment. We were fighting an Asiatic army on Asiatic terms.

Walker's divisions shortly thereafter swept forward and the entire peninsula was wide open. Cavalry patrols should then have been on their way to the Yalu; likely concentration areas for enemy forces in North Korea should have been scouted out, and the Yalu crossings kept under surveillance. With a properly composed and balanced cavalry force, this would have been entirely practicable—if we only had foreseen the need. Instead, the divisions of General Walker moved blindly forward, not knowing from road bend to road bend, and hill to hill, what the future held in store for them. If ever in the history of our armed forces there was a need for the cavalry arm—air-lifted in light planes, helicopters, and assault-type aircraft—this was it. The debacle

that followed our acceptance of combat under these terms is now a tragic chapter in our history.

**T**ODAY, in Europe, cavalry regiments are in battle positions, assigned the job of covering, screening, and delaying. One of the most frustrating experiences that a professional soldier can now know is to sit in at critiques of war games and maneuvers, and listen to staff officers endeavoring to rationalize the present-day cavalry's inability to fulfill its role. The most common analysis of the problem usually ends with some such conclusion as this: "They're cavalry regiments, aren't they? Their mission is a cavalry mission. The failure must be in the way they are handled." If cavalry units fail to provide timely information, or effective screening, their commanders are suspected of—and sometimes charged with—not having performed with sufficient celerity. Or an umpire is charged with allowing the enemy too much mobility.

What I find alarming is the lack of awareness that Russian motorized and armored forces are just as mobile as our own—if not more so. All the soul-searching in the world, and the most brilliant staff cerebrations, will not conjure up tactical success in cavalry action unless the means of achieving it are provided our cavalry commanders. They do not have the means today. They are

road-bound. Even assuming they will be fortunate enough to fight in countries where roads are numerous, they are no more mobile than the mechanized infantry divisions they are expected to screen from the enemy.

**I**T is a simple matter to be critical after the event. It is another to provide, or attempt to provide, answers to the questions raised. Fortunately, most of the answers to the problems in the soldier's trade are not as difficult to come by as may first appear. Several thousand years of experience lie behind us, awaiting understanding.

One of the most striking aspects of man's military past is his persistent search for the technical means to get an edge on his opponent in mobility. When he was successful, and especially when he could organize elements of varying mobility into a cohesive combat team, he was successful in combat. When he failed to solve the technical problem created by his needs, he failed in combat.

\* \* \*

The consul . . . had never seen a phalanx in his life until he encountered one—for the first time—in the Roman war with Perseus; and, when it was all over, he used freely to confess to his friends at home that the Macedonian phalanx was the most formidable and terrifying sight that had ever met his eyes.

**T**HE Persians who opposed the Greeks were fine horsemen. If they had acquired the teamwork and discipline of the Greeks, they should by all odds have won. The Greeks were not only good fighters, however, but smart enough to learn the handling of horses from the Persians. Philip of Macedon was the first great Greek soldier with the vision and organizational ability to match horsemen effectively with the superb Greek foot soldiers. He organized heavy and light cavalry, and trained them to fight in close co-operation with his infantry.

His skill was inherited by his son Alexander, the world's first great cavalry leader, who fulfilled his father's vision. "Cavalry was his dominant arm," writes General J. F. C. Fuller, "and in battle he invariably led [cavalry] in person." Alexander developed and exploited the mobility differential between his infantry and his cavalry to the fullest extent possible in his times. There were subdivisions of each, based upon mobility, and the peltast was retained for close-in screening tasks.

Even as the phalanx reached its highest performance, an opponent worthy of its challenge appeared in the Roman legion. The legion had been coming up

**Lacking cavalry, divisions pushed blindly forward, not knowing from road bend to road bend, and hill to hill, what the future held in store for them**





the hard way, fighting the superb cavalry of Hannibal; it finally defeated him and turned to the east. The legion, like the phalanx, was a traveling fort; yet it had one great advantage over the phalanx: every man was equipped and trained to fight as an individual. As a consequence, the legion was so flexible that it could fight in almost any direction; while the phalanx, in some respects like a modern triangular division, was designed and trained to fight where it was pointed.

The reign of the legion was long, and during it the field of combat experienced Pax Romana. But, as with all victorious ways in war, it could not last forever; and, when the end came, the legion's adversary was tough, combat-ready cavalry. Signs of the coming of the horseman had been seen but little appreciated until the great disaster at Adrianople in A.D. 378, when Emperor Valens lost his legions and his life under the onslaught of the Gothic cavalry.

The cavalrymen appeared invincible after Adrianople, and with each passing century they improved their armor until they knew no opponent worthy of their mettle. True, they became heavier and more immobile, but in their eyes they became only more invincible. Finally, in the thirteenth century, there appeared on the eastern horizon a horseman laying waste to all before him. On the eighth of January 1258, he came to the gates of Baghdad and challenged the pride of the Western cavalry to come forth. The story of this meeting is told by an eyewitness.

We met at Nahr Bashir, one of the dependencies of Dujayl; and there would ride forth from amongst us to offer single combat a knight fully accoutred and mounted on an Arab horse, so that it was as though he and his steed together were [solid as] some great mountain. Then there would come forth to meet him from the Mongols a horseman mounted on a horse like a donkey, and having in his hand a spear like a spindle, wearing neither robe nor armor, so that all who saw him were moved to laughter. Yet ere the day was done the victory was theirs, and they inflicted on us a great defeat, which was the Key of Evil, and thereafter there befell what befell us.

**T**HE impact of the Mongol cavalry on the West was impressive but, on military men in particular, of limited duration. Barely a century had passed before both men and horses had again been armored to the point of immobility. The advent of gunpowder clearly spelled the



**Tanks are road-bound and no more mobile than the infantry divisions they are expected to screen**

end of the armored knight, but this was little realized at the time; those who used gunpowder were often considered criminals and occasionally hanged on the spot. Finally, at Agincourt in 1415, the flower of French knighthood met its doom at the hands of a lightly armored, much more agile force, armed with the long-bow.

Despite this crushing demonstration, the role of the armored knight in the warfare of the Middle Ages continued to be an important one. Often the presence of a mounted man in battle reflected his prosperous station in life, and thus an ability to afford a horse and all its trappings, rather than any awareness of a tactical need. Jousting was a popular military sport, and the charging of armored knights was an approved tactic through all the years while firearms continued to improve. Even after the efficiency of gunpowder had made the armored horse ineffective, many soldiers persisted in arguing that the most decisive and effective tactic in combat was still the cavalry charge.

**I**N our Civil War, the cavalryman shed his armor and adopted the pistol and saber as proper weapons for the charge. But it was in this war, the era of our great cavalry leaders, that such men as Sheridan first enunciated the heretical view that the purpose of cavalry was not merely to ride hell-for-leather. By

the war's end, it was established beyond question that the real purpose of the horse was to deliver firepower where it was needed most. Frequently the cavalrymen dismounted, sheltered their horses and dug in to let the opposing side destroy itself against the high volume of fire they were able to develop—a shrewd adaptation of an existing weapons system to the existing combat environment.

Clearly firepower was building up to such intensity on the battlefield that flesh and bone could no longer prevail against it. The efficiency of firearms and the number of automatic weapons continued to increase until in World War I an impasse was reached. The mobility differential between the components of the land forces had disappeared. The defense completely dominated combat; and Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele were the result. British casualties at Passchendaele were 8,222 for each square mile captured—an all-time high in human sacrifice for the real estate gained.

While men were piling up their bodies in battles of attrition in World War I, the commanders and their staffs were desperately trying to solve their dilemma—only to fall back on a still greater massing of artillery, and assaulting infantry, in the hope of saturating the defenses. Yet already a new form of mobility had appeared; the gasoline-driven land vehicle. Its arrival was too late by a small margin for full exploitation in World War I, but to those who read its meaning correctly it showed certain promise of breaking the stalemate. Tank warfare was sufficiently tested to convince a few visionaries of its great possibilities.

Between the wars they preached. J. F. C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, de Gaulle, and Chaffee argued wherever they could obtain a hearing for the new form of war—or new form of cavalry, which it unquestionably was—offering a mobility differential never before seen or even thought of. Unluckily a number of the German senior officers foresaw its possibilities with equal clarity and instituted an appropriate development program in the Wehrmacht. The German campaigns in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 proved men like Guderian and Rommel to be apt students of their Allied teachers.

**N**OW we are at a point in history where soldiers in the past have often found themselves. In our time, we have

seen the great defensive battles of World War I and the great offensive battles of the early 1940s. Understandably, many veterans remember vividly and well how the lessons of ten years ago were applied in battle. But memory can become idolatry of things past and close our minds to the meaning of events. We quote the preachings of Liddell Hart and Fuller in the twenties as though mere repetition would extend their validity into the present. We run the risk of forgetting that it is not what was said and done, but *why* it was said and *why* it was done, that is important. In the meantime, one of the most—if not *the* most—critically evolutionary periods in military history is upon us.

Not many years elapsed between Kitty Hawk and the great offensives of World War II, yet they were years full of intensive search for the proper exploitation of the new air vehicle in combat. There were those, like their predecessors in years past, who saw the new aerial instrument as the absolute weapon—one such was Douhet. Others, like the visionary Mitchell and Hap Arnold, saw it for what it was: mobility, to enable the means for victory to be brought to the area of decisive combat. General Mitchell's definition of air power is still the best written: *anything that flies*.

The common search for the means of survival brought the airman and the soldier together; and, once joined, their imaginative use of the new form of mobility was rapid. I consider myself most fortunate to have been associated with one of our first units in this new field. I was a member of the Army's 505th Parachute Regimental Combat Team in the invasion of Sicily on July 9, 1943. Its mission was to land between the known enemy reserves and the beaches to be used by our assault divisions, and to screen the landings. There were a number of subordinate missions: to deny the use of an airfield, seize dominant terrain, secure several crossroads, and so on—a typical cavalry mission.

**A**FTER the landings, the first ground forces we encountered were the reconnaissance elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, the cavalry of Fuller's and Liddell Hart's disciples. We had a rough time. Badly scattered, we found that our mobility was not as great as we thought it was; badly outgunned—the Tigers were impressive against our 2.36 bazookas—we nonetheless survived. The success of our mission can best be judged by an enemy evaluation of it:

It is my opinion that if it had not been for the Allied airborne forces blocking the

Hermann Goering Armored Division from reaching the beachhead, that Division would have driven the initial seaborne forces back into the sea. [Postwar interrogation of General Kurt Student.]

We came back with a burning conviction on two points: we needed (1) more accurate air delivery and (2) better antitank weapons. Although first priority was immediately given these problems, when we jumped in Italy two months later we fared not much better. The mission was again a typical cavalry one. The 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, was to land at Avellino, a key to the road network leading to Salerno, and block all enemy movement through that area. The remainder of the 82nd Airborne Division moved from Sicily to Salerno as a highly mobile reserve, and overnight was in combat on the beachhead.

Between Salerno and Normandy every effort was concentrated on improving antitank weapons and accuracy of delivery. For the first time we began the search for a lightweight land vehicle to exploit the unexpected opportunities which invariably characterized—so we were beginning to realize—a landing in the enemy rear. For accuracy of delivery we turned to Dr. Vannevar Bush's office in Washington and, through the personal efforts of Dr. Charles Waring (now head of the Chemistry Department of the University of Connecticut) we were able to obtain colored lights that could be jumped with an individual, set up after landing, and triggered remotely by code (they were later replaced by infrared lights). For antitank weapons, General Ridgway obtained a company of 57mms from a division newly arrived in North Africa. We also redistributed our individual jump loads so that we could jump seven hundred antitank mines per regiment, and we adopted the British Gammon antitank hand grenade.

The 57mms were the best guns we had, though we rarely had them when we wanted them, since they had to be flown by glider. They had to do until we captured the first German panzerfausts in Holland; these made one man equal to the heaviest German tank and started us on an era of relative prosperity. For the solution to the vehicle problem, we put extra armor plate on jeeps. When equipped with automatic weapons and panzerfausts, they—compared to other forms of mobility in World War II—were the best cavalry known to date. Capable of moving by glider several hundred miles in a few hours, and after they landed of coping with anything

they met on favorable terms, they invariably gave a good account of themselves.

**T**HE mission assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division in Normandy was to block all enemy attempts to reinforce the beaches and to attack them from the rear—again a typical cavalry mission. Two months after Normandy the division was in the air once more and on its way to Nijmegen. Much had been learned in the interim. The accuracy of the Holland landings was almost perfect, and antitank weapons were soon obtained in abundance. The division's cavalry troop, the reconnaissance platoon, fully motorized with the new armored jeeps, proved worthy of every confidence. Here was cavalry in the historical sense.

After Holland we began to talk about droppable fuselages, track-laying aircraft, assault transports, helicopters. We were not sure what form the air vehicle would take but we knew that we were on the right track. What we needed next was a closer integration with the inheritors of the cavalry role, the armored forces, without loss to the highly mobile and aggressive character of the airborne forces, the "lean and mean" philosophy. This at once suggested a future for armor in the air-transportable field, possibly *the* future. Certainly it was the area in which the frontier of military knowledge had to be pushed back.

It should be realized that at this time a complementary development of the greatest significance was taking place in antitank weapons. In several fields of research the antitank weapon was showing itself far superior to the tank, clearly indicating that in the near future antitank weapons would reduce even further the mobility differential enjoyed by armor in the early 1940s. Hence the clear and immediate requirement was for exploration of the airborne-armor field in which a new mobility could be found.

**I**F we failed to do this, the least that could happen would be a war of stagnation in which our armored forces, our so-called cavalry, would be as immobile as the enemy. At the worst, an enemy would develop it and achieve overwhelming tactical surprise at the opening of hostilities—as the Germans did in 1939 and 1940. We should find it worth remembering that the first maneuver of airborne troops was conducted by the Russians in 1930, and that in 1935 they moved an entire division by air from Moscow to Vladivostok—3,500 miles.

As an enthusiastic supporter of our

cavalry arm, I am convinced that we will never win another war without it, and that without it we may very likely lose. Korea is eloquent testimony. My own convictions and experiences in World War II led me to write a brief piece on the subject called "The Future of Armor," which was published in both the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* and *Armored Cavalry Journal* in November 1947.

It seemed to me, at the time, that we would have to lighten all items of combat armored equipment, and develop and produce the aircraft to carry the new light armored forces into battle. But I accomplished little. The vehicles in our infantry and cavalry units are no lighter now than they were five years ago—in fact, in most cases they are heavier. Currently, the mobility differential between our infantry and our cavalry—in the form of armored divisions and cavalry regiments—is nil. The same is true of

be used directly against land forces; and the only countermeasure possible is to reduce drastically the numbers of soldiers per square mile in the battle area, which will itself have to be regarded as a zone hundreds of miles deeper than it is at present. Since fewer soldiers will have to cover much more ground, there will be a proportionately greater need for automatic weapons and for a more rapid and efficient supply system to provide them with ammunition. In the solution of these problems the air vehicle will inevitably play a major part.

Since dispersion—individual and unit—will characterize the defense, the greatest need of all will be for the means of concentrating rapidly in the area, and at the time, of decision. Major reserves will have to move by air, and in the tactical zone smaller units will have to be mutually supporting by air as well as land.

Cavalry-type screening missions will

Aladdin-like, overnight. The lead time to their availability could be measured in years while the lead time to disaster could be zero, and this could happen while we relied almost exclusively on the concept of mass retaliation—a concept which finds no justification in human experience as an exclusive and self-sufficient means to victory.

The appeal of the weapon of mass retaliation is understandable; it is spectacular, it carries the war far away from our homeland, and most people believe it to be uniquely American. It does have a role to play—that of destroying an enemy's strategic forces before they can be brought to bear. Thereafter it must take its place among the resources, human as well as material, that our people provide to make victory possible. The weapons system that encompasses every decisive role which men can play, with the least drain on a nation's economy, will be in the long run the system to survive. For man is a land animal and he remains the common denominator in war, whatever form it takes.

Today, even the most casual awareness of the historical lesson should suggest that in ground combat the mobility differential we lack will be found in the air vehicle. Fully combined with the armored division, it would give us real mobility and momentum. Military tactics are not so recondite that there should be anything mysterious in such a conclusion. We have an apt Americanism that sums it up: "I lit 'em where they ain't!"

**A**LL of this may seem very remote from the Greeks, with their hoplites and peltasts, the Roman legion, the armored knight, and the combat philosophy of Nathan Bedford Forrest. It is in time but not in substance; for, to survive and win in battle, soldiers have always had to think of these things, and to move along the curves of history, lest they giddily precipitate themselves and their people into oblivion.

When a modern nation embarks on an unwise military course, however, not only its soldiers are at fault. "In our democracy," said General George C. Marshall fifteen years ago, "where the government is truly an agent of the popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion, and our organization for war will be good or bad as the public is well informed or poorly informed. . . ." What we now need, as a nation, is an understanding of the past that can be converted into tactics and battle hardware, and give its soul back to the cavalry.



**The mobility differential is within our grasp in the air vehicles being developed: assault transports, light utility planes, helicopters and convertiplanes**

the differential between ourselves and the Russians—unless, of course, if we have to fight them, they will be accommodating enough to walk while we are rolling on wheels and tracks.

**T**HERE is naturally much speculation now over the implications of atomic warfare. In spite of conflicting opinions, it seems clear at least that bombs, guided missiles, and artillery projectiles with destructive power measured in the kilotons and megatons are here to stay. If they are used at all, they will sooner or later

have to be conducted at much greater distances, and with much greater rapidity, than have hitherto been considered acceptable. The mobility differential to make this possible *must* be achieved. It is within our grasp, fortunately, in the air vehicles now being developed—assault transports, light utility planes, helicopters, and convertiplanes.

Forces so organized and equipped will have a predominant influence on future warfare. Their readiness at the very outset of combat is essential, yet unfortunately they cannot be produced,



# The Month's Reading

## 'New Look' for Tomorrow

HANSON BALDWIN  
The New York Times Magazine  
18 April 1954

It is not likely—given the power of hydrogen weapons—that a war of the future will be deliberately initiated by urban attacks. For each side has too much to lose and at the start of any war each side might hope to win the war by other means. But if atomic weapons are used tactically—if they are fired from 280mm. cannon on the battlefield and dropped by fighter-bombers operating from carrier decks—atomic war may well spread; it would, indeed, be difficult to confine it.

If the United States hopes for a more stable world, we must retain and develop (as insurance against and for use in, total war) our atomic capabilities. We should continue to train our troops in the tactical use of atomic weapons. But the military and political cost will be heavy indeed if we depend too much upon these weapons. Our "new look" for tomorrow must preserve the capability of balanced forces—forces able to fight and win with conventional weapons, on land, on sea and in the air—and in any climate from the Arctic to the jungle.

All this may seem a heavy and onerous task; indeed there is no assurance that any such policy and strategy of limited aims and means can succeed. There is no assurance that we can win the "cold war" or avert total war; many observers think the odds are against both. But there is no absolute security in the world of man; there is no course without risks. One thing is clear; if we pin all our faith to a strategy calculated to "win" a total war we may lose the "cold war," and we may help to bring on the very thing we are trying to avert.

## Single Commander?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHARLES E. WILSON  
Press Conference  
14 April 1954

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, is there to be a single commander under the Department of Defense with all the Services included in that?

SECRETARY WILSON: We are talking about it. It hasn't been decided.

## Do Not Be One-Sided

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ALBERT KESSELRING  
A Soldier's Record  
William Morrow & Co., 1954

I am both an army and an air-force officer, in the later course of the war holding both air and Army Group commands; I therefore believe I am in a position to appreciate the tasks of individual commanders in both services. If performance is to be judged by results, there can be no question that the Luftwaffe, both strategically and tactically, played a

decisive part in Army operations. Naval strategy is the pace-maker for air strategy. In both arms technical problems loom larger than in the Army. There can be no doubt that an air operation demands profound knowledge and planning which, although on a different level, is not less complicated than that required by the Army. Nor can it be doubted that air operations in the army battle zone or in sea warfare call for a high degree of knowledge and understanding of the rudiments of all three arms.

Results will demonstrate an officer's fitness to be a Field-Marshal, and no one will then ask about his origins, whether he came from the army or the Luftwaffe. But one piece of advice I give to all Air Field-M Marshals: do not become a one-sided technician but learn to think and lead in terms of all three services.

## Background for Treason

WILLARD M. WALLACE  
Traitorous Hero  
Harper & Bros., 1954

Like any political organization not run by angels, however, it [the Continental Congress] made notable mistakes, and none was more glaring or more tragic in its consequences than the treatment of Benedict Arnold. The desire to be appreciated is among the most compelling urges of the human spirit, and when a man peculiarly susceptible to good opinion has performed extraordinary services and is denied recognition, he may wonder, in anger or despair, if the game is worth the candle. Not disposed by inclination or experience to be either philosophical or charitable when thwarted, Arnold was not likely to forget his humiliation by Congress. The background to the treason of 1780 was thus already being filled in with heavy strokes in 1777.

## NATO Today

THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE  
19 April 1954

The North Atlantic Treaty nations today have under active arms in the ground, air and naval forces which are committed to the defense of Western Europe and the NATO perimeter approximately 3,100,000 officers and men. This force, spread from the North Cape of Norway to the Caucasus Mountains of Turkey, is organized in 48 divisions, and there are another 49½ NATO reserve divisions which Supreme Allied Headquarters could call up by "M-plus-30." The strength and table of organization of these divisions varies from country to country. Of the 48 active divisions, 20 are committed to the Central Front in Germany; one Dutch, three Belgian, five French, four and two-thirds British, a third of a Canadian division and five American divisions plus three independent American armored combat teams.

Except for the French divisions, which have recently been

partially combed out to provide additional troops for Indochina, these 20 divisions are at virtually full combat strength. Their equipment is good, their state of readiness the best in NATO. In armor, this force counts about 3,000 tanks, but a third of these are World War II types. They would face tough competition from the 5,500 Soviet Army tanks sitting in East Germany, of which about one-third are the Joseph Stalin III heavy tanks with a 122mm gun, and the rest are the T34's with an 85mm gun.

## Wellington's Leadership

GODFREY DAVIES  
*Wellington and His Army*  
The Huntington Library, 1954

A study of the six years' campaign in the Peninsula may not enhance admiration of the military successes of Wellington and his army. That part of the story has been well known since Napier's *History* appeared. What may be surprising is that the characters of the leader, his officers, and men can stand the closest scrutiny. Of course, Wellington and his lieutenants had their faults and soldiers were guilty of crimes. Yet the clearer the realization of the difficulties confronting the British army in the Peninsula, the greater the admiration for the soldiers who overcame them. Composed of every stratum of society from a duke's son to a jail-bird, the army had become a unified whole. In spite of occasional lapses the army steadily improved in discipline as the commissariat improved. If the army could have been always well fed and regularly paid, the cases of disorder and plunder and, perhaps, of drunkenness, would have been halved or more than halved. Martial valour alone might have gained isolated victories, but campaigns could not have been won against the superior French forces but for the daily care for the men's welfare and comfort exercised by Wellington and all officers who performed their duties.

## History—Pro and Con

BRIG. GEN. PAUL M. ROBINETT  
*Military Review*  
May 1954

The value of history in military education has always been recognized in the United States Army as in most armies. It has been at the very base of instruction in the Military Academy and the service schools and colleges since their inception. In this emphasis on the value of history in military instruction, the American Army has followed the advice of such great captains as Frederick the Great and Napoleon, as well as others who have more recently made their mark on the pages of history. Napoleon has written, "... the knowledge of the higher arts of war is not acquired except by experience and the study of history of wars and the battles of great captains." General George S. Patton, Jr., one of America's great offensive battle leaders, also emphasized the importance of history. His words, written on the battlefield, were: "To be a successful soldier you must know history, read it objectively—dates and even minute details of tactics are useless. . . . You must [also] read biography and especial-

ly autobiography. If you will do it you will find war is simple."

There are dissenters from this point of view, however. Marshal Wavell, for one, holds that the study of psychology and leadership are [sic] of greater importance to a military man than the study of operations, contending that Napoleon's military success can be attributed to his knowledge of psychology rather than to his study of rules and strategy. And Le Bon, who was not a military man, has condemned histories on general principle, observing that "they are fanciful accounts of ill-observed facts accompanied by explanations the result of reflection" and that the writing "of such books is a most absolute waste of time."

## Politics Invades Army

HANSON W. BALDWIN  
*The New York Times*  
22 April 1954

The atmosphere of politics and recrimination and division, not unusual in civilian life but relatively new to the Army, is indeed the more somber part of the background to the [McCarthy-Army] hearings.

For there is no doubt that the great issues of our generation have left their cleavages and lines of schism in the Army as in all our other institutions.

There is no doubt that Senator McCarthy and other politicians and two seemingly conflicting trends have contributed to a common result.

The extensive "civilianization" of the Army, the larger and larger number of civilian officials and civil servants who are working for but not in the Army, and the tendency, past and present, of some prominent Army generals to intrude into political fields have meant the ugly intervention of politics into the Army.

This is indeed one of the meanings of today's hearings; that they are held at all is significant of the extent to which a supposedly nonpolitical organization, the United States Army, is now permeated by politics and controlled by it.

If the hearings contribute to exposing this dangerous trend and to stemming it, they will not have been held in vain.

## Job Description

MAJOR GENERAL J. C. T. WILLIS  
Director General of Ordnance Survey, British Army  
Contributed by Lt. Col. Robert I. Dice, Corps of Engineers

### THE BOSS

I am the coachman.

I am responsible to the owners for the maintenance of the coach and the well-being of the horses.

I decide on the destination of the coach and on the pace at which it shall go.

I am responsible for seeing that the coach reaches its destination with regularity and punctuality.

I see that the willing horse does not overwork, and that the idle horse does his fair share.

I allow no one else to chide or strike my horses.

I hold the reins in my hand.

I accept the blame for all that goes wrong.

I do NOT get off the coach and shove.

## UNIT LOYALTY



Bedecked in scarlet blouses, white piped belts and bearskins, the 2d Battalion, Coldstream Guards is inspected at Buckingham Palace by the visiting Shah of Iran, the late King George VI, and the Duke of Gloucester

# The British Regimental System

**MAJOR JULIAN PAGET**

An English officer tells how the British "regimental system" gives the soldier something to "belong to" and how it works

**I**N the British Army the regimental system has proved to have very great morale value and it may be helpful to your Army to know how the system works.

I should first explain that the British Army uses the term "regiment" in a sense different from that of the U.S.

MAJOR JULIAN PAGET, British Army, joined the Coldstream Guards as a private in 1940, was commissioned a year later, and served in 1944-45 with the 21st Army Group in Northern Europe. After the war he served in Palestine for three years with the 3d Battalion of his regiment. He is now with the British Joint Services Mission to Washington.

Army. Our regiment is not a combat unit, but is used to refer to a group of associated infantry battalions with a common title and common interests, and sometimes even recruited from the same area. The British equivalent of the U.S. regiment is a "brigade," a combat unit composed of three battalions and supporting arms.

The essence of the regimental system is that it means that an officer or soldier can serve throughout his military career within the same regiment and will always belong to it. It creates a group small enough for loyalties and traditions to be built up to an extent which is al-



most impossible in a larger and more impersonal unit. To take my own regiment, the Coldstream Guards, as an example: We are an English regiment with three battalions, and whenever I do duty with troops I shall serve with one of these battalions. These battalions are composed of a mixture of conscripts doing their two-year service, and of regulars who will serve the whole of their Army career in these units, except for periods when they are sent off on "Extra Regimental Employment." Many of them have followed their fathers and grandfathers into the regiment, and there they find themselves serving under officers whose families have likewise served in the Coldstreams for many generations. Even when I am detached on a staff, as I am at the moment, I still belong to my regiment as much as if I were in England; I still wear its uniform and am kept informed by letter of all its activities. All this means the regiment becomes the centre of life for every member of it. Every officer and man knows that he belongs to it always, he grows proud of it and feels a real interest in its every activity. In return, he knows that his regiment is directly interested in him personally, in his welfare and in his career.

**O**UR regimental system is partly organized on a geographical basis with the counties of Britain often having their own regiments of one or more battalions named after them. Some of the larger counties have two regiments, as for example the West Yorkshire regiment and the East Yorkshire regiment. Sometimes two counties combine to form one regiment, as in the case of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. There are also regiments with no direct geographic association, but they have their own distinctive titles and features, as much as the "County Regiments."

Each regiment consists of at least one Regular Army battalion and also probably one or more Territorial Army (National Guard) battalions. On the outbreak of war, the Army is expanded by mobilizing the Territorial Army and then by recruiting new wartime battalions within the various regiments. For example, my own regiment was expanded in the last war from three to six battalions.

The heart of the regiment is the regimental Depot and Headquarters from which all the affairs of the regiment are run. It is commanded by a lieutenant colonel or major with an adjutant, and they are responsible for all purely

regimental matters, such as recruiting, induction and demobilization, individual and regimental records, veterans' welfare, and regimental customs and procedures. The senior retired officer of the regiment is given the honorary title and position of Colonel of the Regiment, with the responsibility of watching over all its interests. He will select candidates for commissions in the regiment from among those who apply, he will represent it on many official and unofficial occasions and will lay down policy on all domestic matters.

**I**T seems to me that the tremendous state pride that exists in the United States should be harnessed to build up a system of combat units in the U.S. Army, similar to the British regimental system, but based on the States. And it is no new and revolutionary proposal, for that was more or less the system in the days of the War of Independence

and the War Between the States. Then, units were named after either the district from which they were recruited or the leader who had formed them.

The chief justification for the regimental system is the morale value that it undoubtedly has for all ranks of the combat forces.

Few things are more discouraging for a soldier than to feel that he does not belong anywhere, and that he is just a "number" to be pushed around from unit to unit with no regard for his personal interests and loyalties. But that is the inevitable result when men do not belong to anything more precise than the infantry or artillery.

Proof that this factor of pride and loyalty in one's unit is a very real asset in war comes from Korea, where it has been reported that the death rate among Allied PWs due to sickness and malnutrition was remarkably low among the British prisoners. Doctors attributed this



In Korea the Gloucestershire Battalion marches off smartly after ceremonies at which it was awarded the American Distinguished Unit Citation for its great stand against encircling Communists.

largely to the regimental system, because it built up a unit pride and loyalty among the men. The result was that men of each regiment invariably helped their comrades in troubles, while men's morale and will to live were raised by their determination not to "let the regiment down" by weak or dishonorable behaviour.

The knowledge of belonging to a regiment also gives a man a sense of security among the many uncertainties of Army life. He knows that he can always turn to his regiment for help and that he is always known there personally and that he matters to his regiment. Even if he leaves for a time, he knows that he will return, and this means a lot. Also, he gets to know his comrades in arms and the officers and men who will lead him in war, and that is of great value.

**T**HE regimental system makes it possible to decentralize some of the administration of individuals and their welfare, and so develop more personal contact than when careers are handled centrally. Regiment can make recommendations for appointments based on personal knowledge of the officer concerned, such as can never be gathered from records and reports. It also gives commanders in the field more chance to obtain men whom they know and trust, rather than feeling that they are in the hands of planners and IBM runs.

Finally, it has a marked effect on morale if officers feel that they have some control over their own careers through their immediate commanders, who in turn are interested in the careers of all members of their units. Few will deny that personal affairs are best handled as far as possible on a personal basis, and therefore the more decentralization that can be achieved the better. Certainly the individuals concerned think so, and that is often more important than mere bureaucratic convenience.

**E**VERY soldier knows the value of tradition as a factor towards good morale and fighting spirit. The regimental system is the ideal means of achieving and fostering traditions in the combat forces. Regiments retain their identity and therefore any achievements of the unit belong to it always. They can be perpetuated in regimental records and built up into fighting traditions to stir future generations to even greater deeds. Men may come and go, but traditions remain. They give men standards by which to act, so that they know what is expected of them, if they are not to betray the honor of their regiment.

Take for example the Gloucestershire Regiment, known to all who fought in Korea. In 1801, the regiment fought against Napoleon's Army in Egypt, and at the Battle of Alexandria, it was surrounded. However, it turned the rear rank about and fought off the French front and rear, finally winning the day. In honor of this victory, its members were granted the distinction of wearing the regimental badge on the back as well as the front of their caps, a privilege granted to no other unit in the British Army. Clearly the proud tradition inspired every member of the Gloucesters as they fought off the Chinese Communists on all sides on the Imjin River, 150 years later.

**A** FURTHER advantage is the connection which is established between Regular Army and Territorial units. Since both are based on one area, an intimate liaison is set up increasing the efficiency of both in peace and in war. They can train together and they share the same customs and traditions. The Regimental Depot administers both these units too, so that it becomes one family.

It undoubtedly improves civilian morale in each area to know that they have a unit which they can claim as their own and feel as proud of as the men who are in it. It is a spur to civilians to do their share toward helping the Army, so as not to let down their local regiment.

A little rivalry properly controlled is a great incentive to achievement in peace and war. The regimental system encourages just this competitive spirit.

A true example of this spirit in war comes from the famous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava in the Crimean War. Through a blunder in the orders, 800 British cavalry charged to almost certain death against Russian guns. As they raced at a gallop into the Valley of Death, a trooper of the 13th Light Dragoons was heard to shout, "Come on! Don't let those — of the Seventeenth [Lancers] get in front of us."

Such a spirit is encouraged by the existence of area units, and it is enough to raise a man's standard of conduct in both peace and war, because it makes him feel that it is the honor of the regiment as well as just his personal honor which is at stake. It is worth many military policemen and reams of orders and instructions.

**F**INALLY, a great advantage of this proposal is that it enables troop rotation to be carried out on the basis of units rather than individuals. In Korea, for instance, the British Brigade was


maintained by keeping the brigade headquarters there and rotating complete new units into it at intervals. Thus the battalion which arrives to replace the unit due to go home has trained and lived as a complete unit for years, the officers and men all know and trust each other and it is all ready to go into the line and try to outdo its predecessors. And how much better it is from the individual soldier's point of view to go into battle with his comrades than to join a strange unit one night and have to fight with men he has never met before.

**T**HERE are of course drawbacks to the regimental system, the main one being that it greatly complicates the work of adjutants general. This is true, because men can no longer be classified simply according to arm of service, but must also be listed according to their regiment so that they can be assigned to their regimental units.

This can cause extra work and complications for the staff, especially if casualties have been heavy. But the burden is not really as great as it sounds, because the bulk of the detailed work belongs to the regiments themselves. They are responsible for the formation and all administration of any reinforcements for their own regiments, and they naturally have all necessary particulars available.

One disadvantage which is sometimes cited against the regimental system is that it increases the risk of one particular area suffering unduly if its units have heavy casualties. This possibility cannot be denied, but the risk is not great if units are not too large, since they are unlikely to be all committed to battle at the same time. In any case, the risk should be accepted as one of the inevitable risks of war; it is no more of a danger nowadays than the possibility of whole cities being wiped out by an atomic attack. So this disadvantage should not be allowed to weigh too heavily against the many advantages.

To sum up, the regimental system has proved itself a tremendous morale factor for combat troops, and has lost none of its effectiveness under modern conditions of war. Its value lies chiefly in the fact that it gives a man a unit in the Army which is his own and to which he can devote his loyalty and pride. It raises the efficiency and fighting spirit of any unit by building up fine traditions and a sense of unit pride. It encourages decentralization in administrative matters and improves relations between the Regular Army, the Territorials and the citizens of the country.



SPAB noses into the Nahe River in its first public test.

## ASSAULT BRIDGE FOR ARMOR

### Heavy stuff leapfrogs stream over back of tank equipped with folding spans

A self-propelled assault bridge (SPAB) that uses an M-4 tank chassis as the center pier in a bridge that can span gaps of approximately sixty feet was demonstrated recently by the 2d Armored Division on the banks of the Nahe River near Genzingen, Germany.

SPAB was built by the Ordnance Corps depot at Mainz from specifications furnished by Brig. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, then assistant commander of the 2d Armored.

The center portion of the bridge is welded to the top of the tank chassis. At each end of the tank two hydraulic-operated treadways are hinged to it.

The pictures on this page show the SPAB bridging a narrow but steep branch of the Nahe River. In another demonstration (not pictured), SPAB positioned itself in the deepest part of the Nahe and lowered its treadways into the water until the ends rested on the river bed. An M-47 tank then waded through the shallow water, mounted the treadways and crossed the deepest, unfordable part of the stream.

In still another demonstration (*see bottom cut*) the SPAB was used to provide a roadway up a steep railroad grade.

The Howze SPAB is not the first attempt to solve armor's small-obstacles crossing problems. Among other types tested by the Army was one built by the LeTourneau road machinery company. Major General L. L. Doan, CG of the 2d Armored Division, who has supervised tests of several types of assault bridges, said that in his opinion the Howze SPAB is "the most practical solution developed thus far."

JUNE 1954



Hydraulic lifts uncoil treadways, position them on banks.

Patton M-47 tank rumbles across the self-propelled bridge.



Tank transport power must help SPAB emerge from stream.



SPAB demonstrates versatility as grade crossing aid.





## ARTILLERY COMBAT

*In a period of four months early in 1951, the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL published two articles on the subject of the defense of artillery positions from the attacks of enemy infantry. These articles reflected reports from Korea that told of swarming hordes of Communist infantrymen descending on artillery positions under the cover of darkness. One of those experiences must have been the one here described in detail for the first time. The article is drawn from Combat Actions in Korea, a new book just published by Combat Forces Press under an arrangement with the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Announcement of this book's publication appears on the back cover of this issue.*

**N**ORTH Korean Communist forces appeared to be near complete victory at the end of August and during the first part of September of 1950. Along the southern coast of Korea enemy troops were within thirty miles of Pusan, the only port and supply base left to the United Nations army. American troops holding this Pusan perimeter at the time consisted of four divisions and a brigade occupying a line in the general area of the Nakdong River from Waegwan south to Masan—a straight-line distance of seventy miles. The irregular front line was twice that long. South Korean soldiers manned the northern section of the perimeter from Waegwan to Pohang-dong on the east coast.

At the beginning of September the North Koreans began a powerful drive against the southern end of the perimeter defended by the U.S. 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions. These attacks achieved limited success and carried the combat into the rear areas behind the American front lines. One penetration fell against the 35th Infantry, a regiment of the 25th Division, soon after midnight on the morning of 3 September. The enemy pushed Company B from its position, surrounded Company G and the 1st Battalion command post, and then attacked several batteries of artillery. Among the artillery units, the heaviest fighting took place within the gun position of Battery A, 64th Field Artillery Battalion, which was in direct support of the 35th Infantry. The headquarters of each of these units was located in Haman at that time.

On the night of 2-3 September Battery A was in position two and a half miles north of Haman near a main road and single-track railroad running east and west between Masan and Chinju. The narrow road from Haman joined the Masan-Chinju road at the small village of Saga, the buildings of which

# The Defense of a Battery Position

**CAPTAIN RUSSELL A. GUGELER**

A battery of howitzers being readied for action against



were strung along the main road. Because of North Korean infiltrators, artillery units were alert to the necessity of defending their own positions, and the battery commander, Capt. Leroy Anderson, kept his area as compact as possible. Three or four hundred yards south of the road there was a low ridge shaped like a half circle and forming a shallow bowl. Here Captain Anderson positioned five of his six howitzers. Since the area was too small to accommodate all of the pieces, he placed the other howitzer on the north side of a railroad track that paralleled the Masan road and divided the battery area. The fire direction center, on the south side of the tracks, was operating in a tent erected in a four-foot-deep dugout within shouting distance of the guns. The wire section had its switchboard north of the tracks in a dugout fifteen to twenty yards south of the cluster of houses, a few of which were used by men of the wire section as living quarters. In addition to the low ridge, there was only one other terrain feature of importance—a gully, about four feet deep, next to the railroad tracks.

Around the battery position Captain Anderson set up ten defensive posts including four .50-caliber machine guns, three .30-caliber machine guns, one observation and listening post, and two M16 halftracks each mounting four .50-caliber machine guns. Four of the posts were on the ridge around the gun position and were connected by telephone wire. The others were within shouting distance.

**U**NIL 0245 on 3 September the battery fired its usual missions in support of the 35th Infantry. The night was dark, and there was a heavy fog in the area—a condition common along the southern coast of Korea during the summer. The battery first sergeant, MSgt. William Parker, was the first to suspect trouble. He was standing near the switchboard dugout when he noticed several men moving along the main road.

He called to them, "Who's there?" and then, when they continued walking, he yelled "Halt!"

Three North Koreans were pulling a machine gun (the type mounted on small, cast-iron wheels) down the road.

They moved down the road a few more steps and then dropped into a ditch, turned their gun toward the battery position, and opened fire. Almost immediately there was enemy fire from several other directions, a large part of it coming from the ridgeline that partially surrounded the main part of the battery. At the south end of the battery position the North Koreans had three machine guns in action against the gun sections and, soon after the first shots were fired, they had pulled another machine gun into place along the road in Saga. From the beginning, the action was divided between the two parts of the battery, divided by the railroad tracks.

Sgt. Herbert L. Rawls, Jr., the wire team chief, saw the North Koreans at the time Sergeant Parker challenged them. Realizing that there would be trouble, he ran first to one of the native houses by the road to awaken several men from his section who were sleeping there, then to the switchboard dugout to warn those men. Near the edge of the switchboard hole Sgt. Joseph R. Pursley was kneeling on the ground splicing a wire. Just as Rawls got there a North Korean appeared and killed both men with a burp gun. He then threw a grenade into the switchboard dugout. The explosion killed two of the three men in the hole; the third man, Cpl. John M. Pitcher, was not seriously injured. He continued to operate the switchboard throughout the night with the two bodies beside him in the hole.

**A**LL this had occurred within a few minutes. At the same time two other events were taking place in the same area. At the first sign of action, Cpl. Bobbie H. McQuitty ran to his ¾-ton truck upon which was mounted a machine gun. He had parked his truck near the road and now, by the time he reached it, the North Koreans had rolled one of their machine guns (one of the two they had in Saga) up just in front of it. With the two machine guns pointed toward each other at a distance of not more than thirty yards, McQuitty's gun failed to fire. He jumped from the truck and ran across the rice paddies toward the front lines of the infantrymen where he had seen a tank the previous afternoon. He now hoped to get help from it. By this time, neither the other two machine guns on that side of the railroad, nor the quad .50s, could fire against the North Koreans in that area without endangering men of the wire section.

Meanwhile, the communications men whom Sergeant Rawls had awakened

North Koreans north of Seoul in September 1950



just before he was killed tried to get away from the building in which they had been sleeping, hoping to rejoin the main section of the battery. In one room of the building were three men, PFC Harold W. Barker, PFC Thomas A. Castello, and PFC Santford B. Moore. Barker left first, running. He had gone only a few steps when he saw one of the North Korean machine guns directly ahead. He turned quickly and dashed back to the house, but as he reached the doorway a bullet struck his knee. Castello and Moore pulled him back into the building and decided to remain in the house. They put Barker on the floor, and then stood in a corner of the room as close to the wall as possible. Unfortunately, several days before this Barker and Castello had picked up two small pups, which now shared the same room. The pups chewed on some paper and

made considerable noise. In an adjoining room there had been another man who also tried to escape, but as he stepped from the building he encountered fifteen or twenty Communist soldiers standing in a group just outside the door. One of them shot him in the mouth and killed him.

Within a few minutes after the North Koreans appeared, five members of the communications section were dead and another man was wounded. Thereafter the enemy fired the two machine guns toward the area of the howitzers but made no attempt to move against the guns or even to search the area for other Americans.


Immediately after the first shot was fired against the men near the switchboard, three machine guns at the south end of the battery position opened fire against the howitzer sections. Two of

these were in place on the low ridgeline at the left front of the guns and a third fired from the left rear. In addition, there was fire from a half dozen or more enemy riflemen. Of the six guns, the three nearest the ridge were under the heaviest fire. There was an immediate interruption of the fire missions while the crews took cover in their gun pits, which were deep enough to afford some protection. There was a period of several minutes, then, before the artillerymen realized what was happening and determined the extent of and direction of the enemy fire.

Meanwhile, on the left, an enemy soldier threw several grenades at the pit occupied by MSgt. Frederick J. Hammer's section. One of the grenades exploded inside the pit, killing one man and wounding several others; another exploded in an ammunition pit and set fire to over a hundred 105mm shells stored there. The men manning the machine-gun posts along the ridge opened fire when the action began but soon realized the enemy had already penetrated to the battery position. They pulled back, going north toward the other halftrack mounting the quad .50s. This weapon fired just a few rounds before its power traversing mechanism failed and, when it could not be operated by hand, the gun crew backed the vehicle a short distance to the gully by the railroad tracks.

It was just about this time that the battalion headquarters called Battery A to ask the reason for interrupting the fire mission. The battery executive officer, Lieut. Kincheon H. Bailey, Jr., answered the telephone at the fire direction tent. Bailey had heard the machine guns firing but was not concerned about it since at that time the front-line infantrymen were not far away and the artillerymen could often hear the noise of automatic weapons and small arms. In turn, he called the gun crews to ask them. Sergeant Hammer and four other gun sections reported their situation but the sixth section, commanded by PFC Ernest R. Arnold, was under such intense machine-gun fire that no one wanted to reach for the telephone on the edge of the gun pit. Bailey reported back to the battalion and went out to investigate for himself.

During the several minutes required to relay this information to battalion headquarters the situation in the battery position developed fast. Sergeant Hammer, seeing his ammunition burning, ordered the men in his section to





make a dash for the gully by the railroad tracks. Within the next few minutes the men manning two other guns managed to escape and get back to this gully. Meanwhile, one of the platoon sergeants had raced over to the howitzer north of the railroad tracks and ordered the gun section to lay direct fire against the hill from which the enemy soldiers had apparently come.

It was about the time the first of these shells landed that Lieutenant Bailey left the fire direction tent to find out what was happening. The powder in Hammer's ammunition pit was burning brightly by this time, illuminating one end of the battery position. As Bailey walked toward that area he saw North Koreans walking around the gun and concluded the crew was dead or gone. He ran back to the nearest howitzer and told the chief of section, Cpl. Cecil W. Meares, to start firing against the ridge. Two howitzers fired a total of eighteen rounds, which burst a hundred and fifty to two hundred yards away. Bailey also urged the gun crew to start firing their side arms against the North Koreans who now occupied the next gun pit—the one Sergeant Hammer's crew had abandoned. For five or ten minutes Corporal Meares's men fired at the enemy soldiers and threw grenades toward the gun pit. Then Bailey and Kotzur decided it would be best to get the crews back to the protection of the gully. They stopped the artillery fire and began calling for the other crews to move back. To give these men some protection, Sgt. Henry E. Baker ran to a nearby 2½-ton truck which carried a ring-mounted caliber .50 machine gun

and began firing this toward the North Koreans. PFC Richard G. Haussler went with Baker to feed the ammunition belts through the gun. These two men, although up high where they could be seen from the entire area as long as the ammunition was burning brightly, fired five boxes of ammunition (1,250 rounds) through the gun in about ten minutes. The battery commander set out on an inspection of the battery position to make certain none of his men remained in foxholes or in the gun pits.

It was about 0315 when all of the cannoneers reached the gully by the railroad tracks—half an hour after the action began. As it happened, the Catholic chaplain of the 25th Division, Capt. John T. Schag, had visited the battery earlier in the day and had decided to spend the night there. When the fighting began Father Schag took charge of a group of men who had been sleeping near him and guided them to the gully then used as the battery defensive position. Once in the gully, he gathered the wounded men together and then helped the medics care for them. Captain Anderson and Sergeant Kotzur organized the men for the defense of the gully. Everyone was now in this gully except for three men in the fire direction tent; Corporal Pitcher, who was still operating the battery switchboard; and Barker, Castello, and Moore, who were still waiting quietly in the house in Saga.

Enemy activity decreased after the men of the battery consolidated their position in the gully although there was a brisk exchange of rifle fire. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Arthur H. Hogan, called several times to find out

what was happening and offered help from one of the other batteries in the battalion. One man at the fire direction tent, Sgt. Carl Francis, yelled to Lieutenant Bailey to ask if he wanted some 155mm fire placed in the area, and Bailey said they'd like to have some on the hill in front of the guns. Colonel Hogan was familiar with the hill and got the first shell squarely on it.

Bailey yelled back to the fire direction center, "Right 50; drop 100; fire for effect."

The men around him groaned when they heard this command, so Bailey changed it to "drop 50; fire for effect."

Colonel Hogan asked for two rounds from the battery of medium artillery and the rounds fell just in front of the guns. Soon after this a tank came down the Masan road from the north and began firing into the enemy positions. It was the tank for which Corporal McQuitty had gone, after his machine gun jammed at the beginning of the action. This helped to reduce the enemy activity although there was scattered rifle fire until the first signs of light that morning. The enemy soldiers then disappeared, and the gun sections returned to their howitzers to assess the damage. The North Koreans had killed 7 men and wounded 12 others of Battery A, destroyed four trucks, and let the air out of the tires on one of the howitzers. On three of the howitzer tubes they had written in chalk the numbers of their company, platoon, and squad. Otherwise, the guns were not damaged. There were 21 dead North Korean soldiers in the battery position. The battery was regrouped on the north side of the tracks and resumed the firing of normal support missions.

## DISCUSSION

EVERY soldier must be mentally trained for the shock of battle and prepared for instant defense of his own and his unit's position. In fluid situations, it must be expected that the front will not be stabilized and that the hostile action will develop well to the rear. Under these conditions, artillery position areas must be selected that not only will permit accomplishing the primary mission of fire support but will also facilitate local defense against enemy action that might interrupt the fire support.

This action demonstrates how an attack of limited strength against an inadequately prepared battery position can be effective in neutralizing a battery. To avoid such interruptions in fire support, batteries must obtain an all-around, completely integrated defense. This is accomplished by

assigning primary and contingent sectors of responsibility to each gun section, by preparing the firing positions of the individual pieces to insure complete cannon fire coverage of the position's perimeter, and by developing fire plans to cover all possible avenues of approach. Into this plan is integrated the fire of the battery's automatic weapons and rocket launchers. Each individual of the battery must be assigned and be ready to occupy a specific defense position. Specific personnel must be designated in advance as a reserve force.

An alarm system must be established and all battery personnel actually rehearsed in the actions they will take when the alarm is given. Day and night security must be completed by installing sufficient observation and listening posts, coupled with adequate communications and patrols that

visit and maintain contact with adjacent units.

THIS action contains incidents of individual bravery and courage, of demonstrated devotion to duty, of the use of initiative, and of leadership in an emergency. But how was it possible for the enemy to walk down the road and into the battery position? The obvious answer is that the defensive organization was unsatisfactory. Weapons had not been checked to insure that they would fire. An alarm or alert system, if used, did not work. How much better to stop the enemy outside a battery position than to let him neutralize the battery, kill and wound soldiers, and destroy matériel. A well-organized and alert defense would have enabled Battery A to repel this attack with a minimum of effort.

### Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. McFerren



No longer burdened with responsibilities, these field grade officers seem almost cheerful as they await Allied orders.

## How the Germans Surrendered

During the last weeks of the war in Europe, the dam burst and a flood of what was once the flower of the *Wehrmacht* poured into Allied prisoner-of-war cages.

**FORREST C. POGUE**

*This article is drawn from a chapter of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command, to be published on 7 June by the Office of Military History, Department of the Army.*

*Here for the first time is told the full story of the surrender negotiations between the Germans and the Western Powers. In preparing this chapter, Dr. Pogue had access to all available records on both sides of the Atlantic and personally interviewed most of the surviving principals on both sides.*

**COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL**



**T**HE first substantial overtures looking to final surrender of German forces were made early in February [1945] by representatives of the German command in northern Italy, who arranged for meetings in Switzerland with Allied agents. Allied authorities in Italy promptly informed the Russians of these talks and asked them to nominate officers to attend future peace conferences if they should be arranged. Despite this frank approach, Marshal Stalin became disturbed as the talks in Switzerland progressed. As his suspicions deepened, he became worried over a possible peace settlement between the Western Powers and Germany which would leave the enemy free to continue the war against the Red Army. He protested strongly to Mr. Roosevelt and, when the latter assured him that nothing was being done against the USSR's interest, declared that the President was not being kept informed by his generals. Mr. Roosevelt characterized the statements given Stalin by his informants as "vile misrepresentations." So strong were the feelings engendered that some Allied leaders wondered at the time if the purpose of the German negotiators was to split the anti-Nazi forces. Delays in the negotiations ultimately postponed any final action in Italy until the last week of the war. However, the suspicion aroused in the mind of Marshal Stalin and his advisers created an atmosphere of distrust which was to surround most of the peace negotiations in northwest Europe.

The first important overtures in northwest Europe were made by members of Himmler's staff. On 2 April Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg of Himmler's Intelligence Service, apparently speaking only for himself and without Himmler's authority, approached Count Folke Bernadotte, head of the Swedish Red Cross. Bernadotte, who was in Germany attempting to get Norwegian and Danish prisoners released into the custody of Sweden, was asked if he would discuss with General Eisenhower the possibility of arranging a capitulation. The Swedish nobleman declared that he would go to the Supreme Commander only after Himmler announced: (1) that he had been chosen as German leader by Hitler; (2) that the Nazi party was dissolved; (3) that the Werewolf organization had been disbanded; and (4) that all Danish and Norwegian prisoners had been sent to Sweden.

Count Bernadotte's conditions were

not met and the Schellenberg suggestion was not passed on to SHAEF. Not until mid-April were peace feelers concerning the surrender of forces in northwest Europe communicated to the Supreme Commander. At this time, reports came from agents in Denmark that Generaloberst Georg Lindemann, German armed forces commander in Denmark, was willing to surrender the army there, but would not include SS and police units. Although the Supreme Commander authorized efforts through unofficial channels to get additional details of the proposal, he forbade Allied officers to be present at the conversations. In reporting this action to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he suggested that the USSR be informed. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, therefore, on 21 April informed the Soviet Government that unconditional surrender of large-scale enemy forces was a growing possibility and suggested that accredited representatives of all three allies be made available to the headquarters on each front for the purpose of observing negotiations for surrender. The USSR was asked to designate such representatives both at SHAEF and at AFHQ. The Soviet high command readily agreed to the suggestion, saying that the names of their appointees would be submitted later.

**H**IMMLER again entered the picture on the evening of 23 April in a conference with Count Bernadotte at the Swedish consulate in Lübeck. Himmler began the conference by saying that the Germans were defeated, that Hitler would soon be dead, and that he (Himmler) was ready to order a capitulation on the Western Front. Count Bernadotte doubted that an offer to surrender on one front only would be acceptable to the Allies, but he agreed to forward the proposal if Himmler would promise to surrender forces in Denmark and Norway. The SS leader approved this suggestion and wrote the Swedish Foreign Minister that he wished to act through the Count. The Swedish Foreign Minister, who shared his fellow countryman's skepticism concerning the acceptability of a surrender on the Western Front alone, nonetheless arranged a meeting between Bernadotte and the British and U.S. ministers in Sweden, Sir Victor Mallet and Mr. Herschel Johnson, who dispatched Himmler's offer to their governments. Mr. Churchill relayed the information by trans-Atlantic

**FORREST C. POGUE** served in the Army from 1942 to the end of the war most of the time as an Army historian. He was on Omaha Beach soon after D-day interviewing the wounded and continued with the V Corps throughout the campaigns, entering Pilsen on VE-day. He was discharged as a master sergeant in 1945 and soon thereafter began to work on the history of SHAEF. He recently presented advance copies of the book to President Eisenhower and Generals Marshall and Bedell Smith at a White House ceremony. A Kentuckian, Dr. Pogue received his Ph.D. in history in 1939 at Clark University.

telephone to President Truman and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the afternoon of 25 April, the day that Soviet and U.S. forces met near Torgau. The President, while emphasizing his desire to end the war quickly, declared he could accept only an unconditional surrender on all fronts and one made in agreement with the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

The 1st Infantry Division takes the surrender of the command of Lt. Gen. Fritz Benicke in Czechoslovakia. Then Brig. Gen. George A. Taylor, seated at the left, and then Capt. Carl Oelwe, interpreter, watch the German commander sign.





This information was relayed to Marshal Stalin. General Eisenhower expressed his satisfaction with the reply and informed General Marshall that the Prime Minister had agreed that the peace overture was an attempt by the enemy to create a schism between the Allies. "In every move we make these days," said the Supreme Commander, making his position clear, "we are trying to be meticulously careful in these regards."

While peace negotiations were still in the talking stage in northwest Europe, the long-drawn-out negotiations in Italy were brought to a close. After a comic-opera interlude in which Kesselring removed the Commander in Chief, Southwest, and his chief of staff and ordered their arrest, and in which the deposed officers brought about the arrest of their successors, the German forces in Italy signed surrender agreements on 29 April effective at 1200, 2 May 1945. The surrender removed the last threat from General Eisenhower's southern front and spelled the doom of German forces remaining in the Balkans.

**A**DMIRAL Doenitz and his advisers canvassed the German position completely on 2 May. Agreeing that the military situation was hopeless, they decided that their main effort should be to save as many Germans as possible from the Red armies. They said they would continue to fight on against the British and U.S. forces only to the extent that they interfered with German efforts to elude the Soviets. Otherwise, the German armies would attempt to avoid combat on the Western Front and strive to escape further bombing attacks. It was recognized that the goal of capitulation on one front only was difficult to achieve at the highest levels because of agreements which existed between the Western powers and the USSR, but efforts were to be made to arrange surrender at army group levels and below.

The German military situation in the north was worsened on 2 May by the break-through of the British from Lauenburg to Lübeck and of the U.S. forces to Wismar. These actions closed "the last gate" through which the Germans could be brought back from the Mecklenburg-Pomerania area. Doenitz held that further fighting in northwest Europe against the Allied powers had now lost its purpose. Making use of a British offer to spare Hamburg as an opening for negotiations, he announced that the city would not be defended. He offered to send a delegation to discuss peace negotiations with Field Marshal Montgomery on the following day.



The bald gentleman is Lt. Ivan Cherniaeff, aide and interpreter to Maj. Gen. of Artillery Ivan Susloparoff, who witnessed the surrender at Reims.

Then Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, signs the unconditional surrender document.



On 3 May, Doenitz again reviewed the German military situation. Staatsminister Frank, present from Bohemia, was not sanguine about the Czechoslovak situation, since he felt that a revolt, which might occur at any time, would make it difficult to hold the protectorate. As possible solutions for strengthening the situation there until the Germans in Bohemia could be saved, he suggested that (1) Prague be declared an open city, (2) possibilities be explored of sending German and Czechoslovak emissaries to General Eisenhower to get favorable capitulation terms in that area, and (3) the Reich government be moved to Bohemia. The third course had been previously considered, but Doenitz opposed it, believing the situation too uncertain. Instead orders were sent to Prague to prepare a plan for defense.

The situation in southern Germany and Austria was reported as being much worse than in Bohemia. Staatssekretär Franz Hayler declared that only in upper Austria was there any true control by the government. Troops and administration in the south showed signs of disintegration and there were numerous indications of opposition by the public to the army. Hayler noted that the old Bavarian flags were reappearing in the south and that there were evidences of an Austrian freedom movement among the Tyrolean *Volkssturm*. He characterized a putsch which had been attempted in Munich as symptomatic of feeling in the south.

Doenitz said he felt the Germans should be pleased every time U.S. and British forces, rather than Soviet forces, occupied a part of Germany. He agreed that the over-all situation demanded capitulation on all fronts, but held that the Germans should not consider it at the moment since it would mean delivering most of the forces east of the Elbe to the Russians.

True to his determination to surrender only to the Western Allies, Doenitz explored further the situation in northwest Europe, in the hope of finding something to offer the British and U.S. commanders. He found some encouragement in Norway and Denmark. Since both those countries wished, now that liberation was near, to avoid any action which would bring reprisals, Doenitz considered there would be no revolt there. Therefore, he ordered his commanders to present a strong front in these countries and directed that efforts be continued to resolve the Norwegian question through Swedish mediation. He approved Seyss-Inquart's efforts to explore peace possibilities in the Nether-

lands, but directed the continuance of the combat mission. He gave specific instructions that the Netherlands should not be flooded further. The Commander in Chief, Northwest, was informed that a delegation was on its way to British headquarters to discuss an armistice and that he should prevent a fast Allied breakthrough to and over the Kiel Canal before negotiations could be concluded. *Armeegruppe Mueller* was set up on 4 May to protect this area.

**M**EANWHILE discussions with Field Marshal Montgomery had begun. Admiral Friedeburg and his party had been instructed to promise that Hamburg would not be defended, and they were to try to secure the 21 Army Group commander's permission for German troops, including the *Third Panzer*, *Twelfth*, and *Twenty-first Armies*, to retire west of the Elbe. They also wanted permission to pass German civilian refugees through the British lines to Schleswig-Holstein. Such terms the army group commanders were not allowed to grant. As early as August 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had issued a short document which outlined instructions to cover possible capitulations by German forces surrendering as units through their commanders.

This document, apparently the basis of the surrender instruments used by the 21 and 6th Army Groups, rested on three main principles: (1) terms of capitulation were unconditional and had to be clearly and expressly limited to the immediate military objects of local surrender; (2) no commitment of any kind was to be made to the enemy; and (3) capitulation was to be made without prejudice to and was to be superseded by any general instrument of surrender which might be imposed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR. Therefore, when Field Marshal Montgomery indicated to General Eisenhower that overtures for negotiations were being made, the Supreme Commander declared that only unconditional surrender would be accepted. He added that an offer to give up Denmark, the Netherlands, the Frisian Islands, Helgoland, and Schleswig-Holstein could be considered as a tactical matter and the surrender accepted.

In accordance with these instructions, Field Marshal Montgomery refused to accept the withdrawal into his zone of German

troops then on the Soviet front, although he said that individual soldiers would be accepted as prisoners of war. The Field Marshal would not turn over these prisoners to the USSR.

**O**N the afternoon of 4 May, German representatives appeared at the 21 Army Group Headquarters at Lüneburg Heath with authority from Doenitz and Keitel to capitulate unconditionally on the British front. They signed an instrument of surrender to become effective at 0800, 5 May, which provided for the "surrender of all German armed forces in Holland, in northwest Germany including the Frisian Islands and Helgoland and all other islands, in Schleswig-Holstein, and in Denmark, to the C-in-C. 21 Army Group. This to include all naval ships in these areas. These forces to lay down their arms and surrender unconditionally." The terms stipulated that the capitulation was independent of and would be superseded by any general instrument of surrender to be imposed on behalf of the Allied powers and applicable to the German armed forces as a whole. Since no discussion was made of the shift of refugees from East Prussia to the west and Kurland to western Germany, Konteradmiral Gerhard Wagner hoped that the way was still open to this action.

The same day, 4 May, also saw the end of operations of the *Twelfth* and *Ninth Armies* at the Elbe. The Red drive south of Berlin had threatened

the extinction of the *Ninth Army*, but some 25,000 to 30,000 of its troops, without weapons and almost totally demoralized, made their way to the *Twelfth Army* about 1 May. Strong Soviet thrusts near the Elbe now made clear that the overrunning of the forces east of the river was a matter of a few days. On the morning of 3 May, General der Panzertruppen Walter Wenck instructed one of his corps commanders to discuss with representatives of the U.S. *Ninth Army* the surrender of the *Twelfth Army* and the remaining elements of the *Ninth Army*. General Wenck's 100,000 troops, now about 40 per cent unarmed, were accompanied by many women and children fleeing from the Soviet zone. The corps commander asked that the *Ninth Army* permit the peaceful crossing of the Elbe by noncombatant personnel and civilians and the honorable surrender of other troops. The *Ninth Army* representatives, pointing to U.S. obligations to the USSR, refused to accept a mass surrender and forbade the civilians to cross the river. They agreed that individual soldiers might come over and surrender to U.S. units, and they apparently did not enforce too sternly the ban against civilians. By the close of hostilities on 7 May, the main body of General Wenck's forces and elements of the *Ninth Army* had crossed the Elbe and surrendered individually to U.S. forces. German estimates of the number who thus gave themselves up to the U.S. *Ninth Army* vary from 70,000 to 100,000.

Maj. Gen. Herman Kramer of the U.S. 66th Infantry Division receives the pistol of Lt. Gen. Fahrmbacker in symbol of the surrender at Lorient.



**I**N southern Germany and western Austria also, the war was moving swiftly to a close. Under Admiral Doenitz's authority to conclude a truce with the 6th Army Group for the area between the Boeheimer Wald and the upper Inn, Field Marshal Kesselring on 4 May notified SHAEF of his readiness to send his chief of staff to Salzburg to discuss surrender terms. General Eisenhower declared that unless the offer included all enemy forces in *Army Groups Center*, *South*, *E*, and *G*, and all outlying garrisons, and all forces facing the Red Army, the Germans should send their representative not to SHAEF but to the 6th Army Group. Accordingly, General Schulz, commander of *Army Group G*, sent forward a delegation to the Thorak estate at Haar near Munich. There they met Generals Devers, Patch and Hai-

slip and on 5 May signed an instrument of surrender to become effective at 1200, 6 May. Included in the unconditional surrender were all elements under *Army Group G*. In spite of this surrender, some SS troops fought on, and one minor engagement ensued near Woergl when SS men attempted to retake Itter Castle, where important French prisoners had been held, after the original German garrison had surrendered it to the Americans. The original garrison helped to beat off the SS attack, and the garrison commander was killed in the process. An example of SS contempt for Regular Army groups was seen on 7 May when Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen SS Gottlieb Berger, near the top in SS ranks, asked to surrender his own battle group, saying that he was not bound by the *Army Group G* capitulation. His surrender marked the end of enemy opposition on the 6th Army Group front. The Seventh Army completed its activities on 8 May with the seizure of von Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List, Kesselring, and Goering, and the liberation of King Leopold.

General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger, commander of the *Nineteenth Army*, came to Innsbruck where on 5 May he signed an instrument of surrender handing over those parts of the provinces of Tirol, Vorarlberg, and Allgaeu up to the Italian frontier which were under the jurisdiction of the *Nineteenth Army* commander. Hostilities were to cease by 1800, 5 May. Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, commander of the U.S. VI Corps, representing General Devers and General Patch, signed for the United States Army, and Col. T. Demetz (Chief of Staff), representing General de Lattre, signed for the French First Army. Complications arose, however, because General der Infanterie Hans Schmidt of the *Twenty-fourth Army* had previously made contact with the French First Army and arranged to negotiate the surrender of his forces. Just before the interview was to take place, his army was attached to General Brandenberger's and his forces were surrendered with those of the latter. Holding that the capitulation of the *Twenty-fourth Army* had not been made, General de Lattre ordered hostilities continued against General Schmidt's forces. He demanded that General Brandenberger take immediate measures required for the *Twenty-fourth Army* to surrender directly to the French. Fighting continued between French forces and General Schmidt's units until 7 May, when

General Devers issued a cease fire order.

After Brandenberger capitulated, Keitel had instructed Kesselring to assume command of *OB SUD*. Kesselring and his subordinates were ordered to conduct operations so that time could be won in order to save as much of the civilian population as possible from the Soviet forces. If the Bohemian front could not be held against superior enemy attacks, forces in the east were to retreat in a southwesterly direction with the goal of bringing the "valuable human material" of the army groups out of the Russian zone. On 6 May, Kesselring was ordered to make no further resistance to any penetration of U.S. forces eastward into the Protectorate of Bohemia and farther south.

**M**EANWHILE, arrangements had been made for Admiral von Friedeburg to proceed to Supreme Headquarters at Reims on 5 May to open negotiations for the surrender of the remaining forces in the west. The Germans still hoped to gain time in which to bring their troops facing the Russians into the western zone. Realizing this, General Eisenhower cabled Moscow of his intention to inform the German emissaries that they must surrender all forces facing the Red Army to the Russians. The surrender was to be purely military and entirely independent of political and economic terms which would be imposed on Germany by the heads of the Allied governments. The Supreme Commander believed it highly desirable for the surrender on the Eastern and Western Fronts to be made simultaneously, and indicated that he would invite General Susloparoff to attend negotiations looking toward surrender of the enemy in the west. The Soviet reply stated that it had no objection provided Doenitz surrendered German troops in front of the Soviets to the Red Army.

**G**ENERAL Eisenhower was informed on the evening of 4 May that German representatives would be flown to Reims from 21 Army Group Headquarters the following morning. In preparation for the negotiations, he told General Smith that there would be no bargaining with the Germans and stipulated that he would not see them until after the surrender terms were signed. General Smith and General Strong, who had handled the Italian surrender in 1943, were chosen to discuss terms with the Germans. To assure the Soviets that nothing underhanded was being done, General Eisenhower gave instructions that General Susloparoff and Lt. Col. Zenkovitch be

called to Supreme Headquarters before the Germans arrived.

In addition to notifying General Susloparoff of approaching negotiations, General Eisenhower kept Moscow informed of the developments at Reims and asked if the Soviets wished to add to or modify the demands which had been presented. Further, General Eisenhower asked whether they desired "the formality of signing to be repeated before any other Russian representatives" at any other place they might care to designate, and whether they wished to participate in the more formal ratification meeting to follow. This message was handed to Soviet liaison representatives in Moscow by members of the Allied Military Missions, but no direct contact could be established with authorized members of the Red General Staff, who were said to be absent in the country as a result of the Russian Easter weekend. This meant a delay in any reply Moscow might make, and was possibly responsible for the fact that General Antonov's request that the surrender ceremony be held in Berlin was not made until after the signing at Reims.

Shortly after 1700, 5 May, the Germans arrived at Reims and were taken to General Smith's office. On coming before the SHAEF chief of staff, Admiral Friedeburg proposed to surrender the remaining German forces on the Western Front. General Smith informed him of General Eisenhower's refusal to continue discussions unless the Eastern Front was also included in the surrender offer. To make clear the hopelessness of the enemy situation, the SHAEF chief of staff displayed maps of the existing enemy situation as well as special maps on which some imaginary attacks had been projected. The German emissary was impressed, but he declared that he lacked authority to surrender on both fronts. After studying a copy of the proposed Allied terms, Friedeburg cabled Admiral Doenitz asking that he be given permission to sign an unconditional and simultaneous surrender in all theaters of operations or that the chief of OKW and the commanders of the air and naval forces be sent to Reims for that purpose.

**G**ENERAL Eisenhower's strong stand shocked the members of the German high command when they received Friedeburg's report. Doenitz found the demands unacceptable and decided to send Jodl, strong opponent of surrender in the east, to explain why over-all capitulation was impossible. His resolution was strengthened on the morning of 6 May by news of an uprising in Prague,





This was the surrender that counted the most. In the War Room of the red schoolhouse at Reims on 7 May 1945, representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union sit across the table from Col. Gen. Gustaf Jodl, Doenitz's Chief of Staff, and his aides. Americans include Gen. Smith and Lt. Gen. Spaatz.

which ended any hope of a political solution of the problem in Czechoslovakia and made virtually impossible the withdrawal of Schoerner's forces. Doenitz directed his staff to continue to try to save as many Germans as possible from the Soviets, while keeping rigidly to the terms of any armistice concluded with the Western powers.

General Jodl opened negotiations with General Smith and General Strong on the evening of 6 May. Concluding after more than an hour of discussion that the Germans were merely dragging out the talks to gain time for their forces in the east, the Allied officers put the problem before the Supreme Commander. His reaction was that unless the Germans speedily agreed to the terms of surrender "he would break off all negotiations and seal the Western Front preventing by force any further westward movement of German soldiers and civilians." This answer was also reported to General Susloparoff, who was not sitting in on the meetings with the Germans. General Jodl, faced with General Eisenhower's threat, wired Admiral Doenitz for authority to make a final and complete surrender on all fronts, saying that he saw no other alternative except chaos.

Admiral Doenitz characterized the Supreme Commander's demands as "sheer extortion." He felt impelled nonetheless to accede to them because Jodl, who only the day before had strongly opposed surrender of the forces in the east, now

insisted that this was the only way out for the Reich. The Grand Admiral was consoled somewhat by the reflection that he could save many of the troops in the east during the forty-eight-hour period before the capitulation went into effect. Shortly after midnight he instructed Keitel to wire: "Full power to sign in accordance with conditions as given has been granted by Grand Admiral Doenitz." When this message arrived at Reims, activities were transferred from General Smith's office to the War Room, where the final signing was to take place.

**S**ENTIMENTAL newspapermen gave the American public a misleading picture of the building in which the peace terms were signed with their dispatches saying that the capitulation ceremonies took place in the "little red schoolhouse of Reims." Actually, the Ecole Professionnelle et Technique de Garçons—a modern, three-storied, red brick building—had more floor space than the Hotel Trianon Palace which had housed the General Staff of SHAEF at Versailles. The War Room, it is true, was not very large. Approximately thirty feet square, it was a small recreation hall where the students had played ping-pong and chess. Huge maps covered the walls, showing the location of all Allied divisions and supply units, the main airfields, results of air operation, data on transportation and supply, weather conditions, progress of daily operations, casualties, and the

like. For the signing, the room had been filled with the equipment of the seventeen photographers and newsmen who had been chosen to represent the Allied press at the ceremony. A large table, which teachers had used in grading their papers, stood in the center of the room. Here about 0200, 7 May, General Jodl, Admiral Friedeburg, and the former's aide, Maj. Friedrich Wilhelm Ockenius, were brought before General Smith and other representatives of the Allies. When asked by General Smith if they were ready to sign, the Germans replied in the affirmative. General Jodl affixed his signature to the two documents placed before him, and they were then signed by General Smith for the Supreme Allied Commander and by General Susloparoff for the Soviet high command. General Sevez of the French Army signed as witness. The time was noted as 0241, 7 May 1945. At this point General Jodl rose and said: "General: With this signature the German people and German armed forces are, for better or worse, delivered into the victors' hands. In this war, which has lasted more than five years, both have achieved and suffered perhaps more than any other people in the world. In this hour I can only express the hope that the victor will treat them with generosity."

The subsequent surrender ceremony at Berlin was largely anticlimactic to most of the world, which viewed the surrender at Reims as the end.

# CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

## No. 10 *Airborne Officers*

**M**ANY officers with an eye to the future are alert to the capabilities (and limitations) of airborne forces. This article is intended to answer some of the questions and outline some of the advantages of being airborne trained.

Requirements for airborne officers have existed since the parachute test unit made their first jumps in August 1940. Although there are approximately 7,900 airborne officers on active duty, they are not always available to fill the 2,400 airborne requirements. It is not logical to assume that all airborne officers will be available at all times for assignments requiring airborne experience. Generally speaking, Career Management branches are not short of qualified airborne officers, but they sometimes experience a little difficulty in filling a requirement—usually because of non-availability. For example, there are approximately 1,000 airborne artillery officers on active duty to fill an authorization for some 500 officers; yet a shortage exists in our airborne units for artillery officers. There has been a constant need for volunteers in our Airborne Special Forces Units. These units are specially organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations within or behind enemy lines for military purposes.

**F**ROM a career standpoint, the most distinct advantage of being airborne qualified is that it provides more varied assignments. Probably you have said many times that you would give anything to get back to troops. Being an airborne officer could increase your chances of getting troop duty. For example: an airborne artillery officer returning from overseas may be considered for assignment to any one of the eleven

airborne artillery battalions, in addition to conventional artillery battalions. An airborne infantry officer has six additional regiments and one RCT. By the same token, an airborne officer needing staff duty has more opportunities of receiving such an assignment. Officers with airborne experience are in continuous demand on all high level staffs, including the Departments of the Army, and Defense. In addition, there are requirements for airborne officers in the XVIII Airborne Corps, 11th and 82d Airborne Divisions, 508th Airborne RCT, and various boards.

**O**FFICERS normally are selected for airborne training only if available for assignment to airborne duty following such training. This is not a hard and fast rule, however. The reason for the assignment to airborne duty immediately following training is to afford you an opportunity to gain airborne unit experience, and thus become qualified as an experienced airborne officer. An experienced airborne officer is defined as one who has served a minimum of one year in an airborne organization, unit or staff, and has participated in the planning, preparation and execution of an airborne operation, field exercise, or maneuver. In order to insure that newly qualified airborne officers will receive adequate unit training, Career Management Division has permitted lieutenants to serve at least nine months with an airborne unit, and all other grades have been permitted to serve at least one year prior to reassignment. An exception to this assignment procedure may be made in accordance with the needs of the Army or branch of service concerned.

After you become an experienced air-

borne officer, additional assignments will be opened to you on various staffs, airborne officer at DA, Army or Corps level, various military assistant advisory groups, military missions, and as an instructor in airborne tactics and techniques in our service schools.

If an airborne officer is to be utilized effectively, he must be readily identified as such. Each airborne officer is identified as such by prefixing a "7" to his MOS, and retaining the prefix to his primary MOS as long as he remains qualified for airborne duty, irrespective of duty assignment. This MOS prefix is removed if the officer becomes physically disqualified, or if he submits a request for removal from airborne duty through command channels to his career branch, stating his reason or reasons for such a request. Career Management Division maintains a ready reference of all airborne officers on active duty by keeping a current listing of these officers, showing name, rank, branch of service, MOS, major command assigned to, and other pertinent data. In order to assist Career Management Division in giving airborne officers assignments commensurate with their grade, experience and desires, the career branches should know whether or not the officer desires an airborne assignment. A good place to put this information is in your annual preference card.

The needs of the service, the officer's qualifications, and when possible, his individual preferences are the factors which regulate the assignment processes. Airborne officers are utilized in non-airborne assignments when their services are required, and career-wise to gain the broadening experience necessary for a balanced military background.

## More Fire Power for a Fire Power-plus Army



**HONEST JOHN: Medium  
to Long-Range Rocket**

### New Rocket and Missile Give Field Artillery Much Heavier Punch and Far Longer Ranges

**Honest John** is a surface-to-surface, free flight rocket without electronic guidance controls. Simple in design, Honest John crews use standard fire control techniques. It can deliver either atomic or conventional explosives.

Its range is medium to long and it is designed for close fire support of ground combat forces.

Honest John consists of a rocket weighing several tons and a mobile, self-propelled launcher. The rocket has a forward compartment containing the warhead; a motor in the center of which the propellant is fitted; and a fin assembly at the rear.

It comes from the arsenal assembled except for the explosive warhead and fins which are added near the launching site.


**Corporal** is a surface-to-surface guided missile containing electronic equipment which permits it to be guided in flight. Its ranges are far beyond those of any conventional artillery piece, including the 280mm gun, and also beyond those of the Honest John rocket. The battlefield commander can use it to strike selected targets far beyond the front lines in any kind of weather and without reference to visibility.

Corporal equipment consists of the missile, a mobile launcher and guidance devices. A self-propelled, hydraulically operated erector places the missile in firing position.

Work on missiles and guidance systems that resulted in the Corporal began in 1944 when Army Ordnance arranged with the California Institute of Technology to experiment in the application of rocket propulsion to artillery range missiles.




*The Corporal's "transporter-erector" comes equipped with a bulldozer blade to scoop out the launching site*



*The transporter-erector lifts the Corporal into position*



**AND AWAY SHE GOES!**





# CEREBRATIONS

## Picture the Errors

LET'S put our Army photographers to work. By work I don't mean the photographic stuff beloved of PIOs. Let them work at training soldiers in fieldcraft.

Colleges put the camera to work to train their football teams years ago. Coaches and their teams spend hours studying films of their previous games and the games of their forthcoming opponents. The fine points that are obtained through detailed study of these films have been of great worth, and more than justified the expense involved.

If our larger football farms have found that photographic analysis helps win games, is it not worth giving serious attention to the consideration of the role of the camera in safeguarding the nation's investment in its soldiers?

We have training films galore, but why stop there? Let's use still and motion picture cameras to pick out flaws in our field work.

Here's one way it could be done. When a unit is thought to be proficient, set up field tests that will really check its mastery of the technique involved. Then place motion picture cameras in the tactical area, one on each flank, and one on the enemy position. Assign a man with a 35mm camera with each umpire. Have another man with a portable tape recorder. When the problem starts, the still camera men shoot such pictures as the umpires request. When orders are given, they are picked up on the tape recorder.

As the troops near their LD, the umpire radios to the movie camera operators, and they shoot the entire problem from concealed and camouflaged cameras set down at the height of the enemy in his foxhole. Quite possibly a fourth camera might be placed in a liaison plane to get further coverage. The problem over, the normal critique is held, and the troops are dismissed.

A week or so later, when the films have been processed and edited by the umpire personnel, the *real* critique is held. The troops are reassembled, and the photographic evidence is presented, with appropriate comments. Properly exploited, this material should do a vast amount of good. Errors will be obvious to the most dull-witted. Deficiencies in the training of the unit and its individuals can be noted. While the good actors will have nothing to fear, the bad actors will have few chances to make excuses.

Our present training films show the right way to do things, or if they do present the wrong way, it is always corrected. But the pictures I want will show errors, and these errors are the sole justification for their existence. It is better to have a camera show up bad technique than to have the error exposed by enemy fire.

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department of your JOURNAL is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

Stills from the films could be blown up and placed where the troops could see them, and profit by what they see. The training value of such material can be considerable.

CAPT. DONALD G. ROSS

## Judging Distance

I WOULD like to suggest a quick, inexpensive, and simple way to encourage soldiers to learn to judge distance and thus encourage accurate marksmanship.

Perhaps one of the reasons soldiers do not fire in combat is that they are not confident of hitting the target. They do not hit the target because—among other things—they do not set their sights for the different ranges at which targets appear. They do not do this for several reasons, one of which is that they do not know how far away the target really is. They cannot judge distance. If a soldier does not set his sights, there is little chance of much effective fire being directed at the longer ranges.

This inability to judge distance is a product of modern life. Most of us live in cities where there is little demand for looking at things farther than—at most—one hundred feet away. Just watch yourself sometime and see how little distance looking you do. Looking at distances is something that goes—I suspect—almost exclusively with rural living. A person never learns to distinguish between 100 and 150 yards or between 375 and 425 yards if he never really needs to look beyond one hundred feet.

To remedy this lack of skill we must present the opportunity that has been missing in the past. We must give our rifleman the chance to see various dis-

tances over various types of terrain and to be told how great these distances are. A mental yardstick must be set up in the soldier's mind against which he can compare any distance that he meets in combat firing. This can't be done, I think you will agree, by a few classes in range estimation. It must be a continuous thing. The distance that he sees every time he goes on the range helps establish this mental yardstick, but it isn't nearly enough. Rifle ranges are flat and even. Combat isn't fought in this type of terrain very often. Therefore, the soldier must learn to judge distance in the various types of terrain over which he will fight if he is to learn to quickly and accurately set his sights and fire at targets now passed up as being too far away or else fired at and missed.

Here is a method of giving this training quickly and effortlessly.

Every camp could be converted into an off-duty training area in range estimation by covering it with small signs showing how far away it is between the sign and various points within seeing distance of it. Everywhere a soldier goes, he would see statements of distance to various points on these small signs. They should be posted everywhere; several in front of the PX, several in each company area, along deserted roads, in wooded areas frequently used for training, along frequently traveled highways and walks, near the service club, etc. Everywhere combat terrain is found or everywhere soldiers congregate or even stop long enough to notice a sign, would have a few of them. Walking along the road, he constantly sees signs saying: "From here to the railroad crossing—35 yards" or "From here to the water tower—900 yards." There are countless variations possible.

Another version would be to have the signs ask a question with the answer painted on the opposite side of it. This type would be impossible to nail to walls, trees, fence posts, etc., but when standing on a stake would enable the individual to test his ability. Perhaps a combination of both types would be best. "How far is it to the chapel?" The same system can be used to teach men to judge height: "The flagpole is 75 feet tall." It could also be used to teach estimating in mils or degrees: "From one end of the rifle range to the other at this point is 1200 mils." "From this point, the

## Supporting Device for Telephone Lines

WHILE commanding amphibian units in World War II and Korea, I saw a need for a device to hold up poles used for supporting signs and telephone lines, instead of the conventional stakes and guy lines, that were constantly being knocked over by vehicles.

I adapted a standard engineer picket by flattening the screw point into a spade-shaped end and straightening out the lower and upper turns. The middle turn, by means of a rod or stick, was used to screw the picket into the sand. A ring or a turn was made at the top of sufficient size to hold a pole of 2-inch or less diameter (see sketch).


After the screw was bored into the sand, a twelve-inch hole was made for the butt of the pole adjacent to the screw. The pole was then placed through the top turn and into the hole.

About one hundred of these "beach screws" were made and used on many beach landings in the Far East during 1951-1952. During these same years "beach screws" were loaned to Marine Corps amphibian units to their great satisfaction.

These are the advantages of the "beach screw":

(1) Eliminates lines, stakes, hammers and other bulky materials necessary to erect poles in the conventional manner.

(2) Reduces the time necessary to



erect poles by about seventy-five per cent.

(3) Changing or removing of pole is a simple process.

(4) Telephone poles and lines can be erected as fast as men can walk along the ground.

(5) Can be used in many types of loose soil, including rice paddies.

(6) Facilitates repair of telephone lines because inspection is simplified.

(7) Permits salvage of telephone lines that normally are unserviceable after combat use.

LT. COL. JOHN B. B. GIBBON, JR.

bridge and the top of the hill on the left are 1000 miles apart."

Some wouldn't bother to look, but most people would pick up knowledge of distance judging effortlessly from daily experience. If only the sniper in each squad took an interest, it would make the whole cost and effort of putting these signs up well worth while. Setting them up means valuable training for those who do it. Naturally, the longer distances can be most easily measured by a range finder while setting the signs up.

We should set up a system that will give our men a chance to see as many long ranges as possible so they will have some known terrain against which to compare combat terrain in estimating distances before they set their sights.

LT. ROBERT McQUIE, JR.

## Only One in Eight . . .

ONLY one in eight Infantry officers will find it possible to attend any of the classes conducted at The Infantry School this year.

It is certain that a great many of you are not going to get a chance at that

resident class you should and would like to attend.

If an Infantry officer has not finished one of the advanced classes at Fort Benning he is seriously handicapped. These courses are prerequisites for higher schools and for many command positions. Promotions also have a tendency to depend to some degree upon completion of this schooling.

You must consider the situation seriously. Not much chance to attend one of the classes, but you had better have the credit on your "66" if you want to get somewhere.

There is an answer to this problem: the Extension Courses program. But, right now, it is a partial answer only. You can do a fine job of learning the latest infantry doctrine and technique, and prepare yourself well for a higher position by extension courses, but you cannot get comparable credit. It's not the same thing as attending a resident course.

Unquestionably, extension courses are the best way, next to attendance at service schools, of increasing your military

knowledge. The courses are written to parallel resident instruction. They are kept up to date by constant revision, and the same quality of teaching is maintained. An example is the Associate Advanced Course at The Infantry School, which offers 600 hours of extension work—only sixty hours less than the resident course. Those 60 hours are spent in practical work.

You can, with extension courses, prepare yourself very well, so far as doctrine and technique are concerned. But you will miss the demonstrations and practical work. Of course, the resident instruction is best for this very reason, but as a substitute, extension courses do a good job. They can be made to do better.

There are two aspects of the extension system which, if built up, would bring the courses to the point where they would warrant comparable credit with the resident classes.

First, a higher standard of work should be demanded, and the examinations made comparably more difficult. This should be carried to the point where the courses would be even more difficult than resident instruction. This would better determine the qualifications of the officer, and in a way offset the advantages gained from practical work. The prestige of the extension courses would be raised.

Secondly, the time limit on courses should be made definite and relatively short. The minimum now required, of 30 hours of accredited work every 12 months, is too lenient and allows the course to drag. This not only creates an administrative burden, but tends toward desultory work and poorer final results.

These two changes would revitalize the whole extension program and make it truly comparable in importance with resident courses.

There are many who think that it takes a great deal more initiative, determination and hard study to finish successfully an extension course than it does resident instruction. Many superiors are inclined to rate higher an officer who has taken extension work because they find he has acquired as much knowledge, and is much prouder of his achievement.

The successful completion of an extension course series, coupled with on-the-job training in comparable situations, should bring the student officer equal credit with that given resident students.

All this should be done as soon as possible so the ratio of one in eight would not be so discouraging.

LT. COL. RUSSELL S. PRICE

# The Word from the Schools

## THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

### Tactics Added

The official title of the Department of Combined Arms has been changed to: Department of Tactics and Combined Arms.

### Maintenance Funds Saved

A cut in maintenance inspections is one of TAS's several recent contributions to the management program designed to save time and money. Lengthening the period between ordnance (maintenance) inspections of artillery weapons in the Department of Matériel will result in a yearly saving of \$4,819.00 in ordnance funds.

Lubrication orders specify that, during inactive periods, intervals between inspections may be extended commensurate with adequate preservation. The artillery weapons used by Department of Matériel are training aids, are seldom fired, and are rarely exposed to weather conditions; in addition, they are disassembled once every thirty days for instruction in battery and battalion level maintenance. On the basis of those facts, ordnance inspections were changed from once every 6 months to once every 12 months.

### The GFT Fan

The graphical firing table (GFT) fan, more commonly known as the "Rizza" fan, has been tested by AFF Board No. 1 and recommended as interim standard FDC equipment. Existing GFTs and range-deflection fans are replaced by this instrument, which combines those two graphical aids. With the GFT fan, one operator can simultaneously derive deflection, elevation, and fuze setting for firing. Its use should significantly reduce time required in FDC to process a fire mission.

A training circular to cover this instrument has been prepared in draft by TAS and forwarded to OCAFF for approval. The proposed publication, "The Graphical Firing Table (GFT) Fan," provides a description of the fan, its uses (e.g., methods for determination of chart data and application of corrections), and the techniques employed in setting up both the fan and firing charts. The TC will be published when final approval of the fan is given by the Department of the Army.

### TAC in "Exercise Spear Head"

More than 350 officers and men of The Artillery Center participated last month in "Exercise Spear Head," the armored maneuver at Fort Hood.

Included in the group from Fort Sill were a platoon of the 88th Field Artillery Battery (Searchlight), (another platoon of the battery was in Operation Flash Burn in North Carolina); the 99th Transportation

Army Aircraft Repair Team; the 163rd Transportation Company (Light Truck); a magazine platoon from the 424th Ordnance Company (Ammunition); and a provisional umpire detachment.

The umpire detachment of 67 officer and enlisted specialists received 50 hours of instruction here in preparation for their duties. At Fort Hood, they attended an additional week of class and then spent five days in the field with the Aggressor force before the maneuver began.

## THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

### Test Revisions Under Way

Infantry training tests are currently being revised at TIS. The revisions will generally follow the form of the present ATTs 7-13 and 7-25 (rifle squad and rifle platoon). More emphasis is being placed on a standardized test and a more complete test. Check sheets are being revised to eliminate non-specific questions.

### Resupply by Helicopter

A demonstration of emergency resupply by regimental helicopter has been added to Phase II (Battalion Trains Area) of problem 7663 (Regimental Combat Supply Systems). Students are shown the practicality of using helicopters to deliver small quantities of supplies or equipment into areas for emergency use or until normal resupply procedures can be started (or re-established).

### Graphic Training Aids Approved

Graphic Training Aids for use in mortar instruction have been approved. Large enough to accommodate a class of about 40 students, the following GTAs may be drawn through any Army Training Aid Center:

GTA 7-5	Theory of Target Grid System
GTA 7-7	Technique of Indirect Fire, 60mm Mortar
GTA 9-624	Mortar, 60mm M19
GTA 9-625	Mortar, 81mm M29
GTA 9-626	Mortar, 4.2 inch M30

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

### ARTILLERY QUOTATION OF THE MONTH

*Renown awaits the commander who first in this war restores artillery to its prime importance on the battlefield.*

WINSTON CHURCHILL  
1941

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

## New Training Films

Production of two airborne films "Assembly of an Airborne Unit" and "Duties of the Jumpmaster," has begun at TIS.

The initial script writing for the film, "Men of the Airborne," began 1 February. This film, which will be used for orientation and recruiting purposes, shows the training received in the Airborne Qualification Course at the Airborne Department, TIS. (Completion date of this film is 1 July and it will be available about 1 September.)

## ROTC Summer Training

Colonel Richard J. Werner, PMS&T of Clemson College has been named Deputy Camp Commander for ROTC summer training at TIS.

The 1600 cadets will study General Military Science subjects. The majority of the training will be in the field and will include demonstrations of the duties of technical service units and a number of exercises to be staged by TIS.

## Ranges for Civilian Groups

Fort Benning rifle ranges are now available to qualified civilian organizations when not in use by the Army. Requests for use of the seven ranges must first be made through the Director of Civilian Marksmanship, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. After obtaining D/A permission, organizations must attach the D/A reply to a request to the Commanding General of TIC, for final authorization and requirements.

Groups using the ranges must supply their own ammunition. However, qualified range officers are present for supervision of safety and operation during all firing. A limited number of rifles may be loaned upon request.

## Map-Coloring Process

A TIS sergeant has devised a shorter, easier way to color contour maps that will result in faster operations by combat infantry units.

M/Sgt. Henry R. Sheridan, chief clerk of The Infantry School's Intelligence Group in the Staff Department, devised a method to provide maps to small units and patrols quickly.

With the help of a brush, some hectograph ink, colored pencils and duplicator gelatin film, Sgt. Sheridan can turn out 25 to 35 colored maps from one master copy.

First step in the process is to color a master map with indelible transferrable material, such as hectograph ink or ditto pencil. He then transfers the impression from the master map to a damp gelatin pad.



# Irons in the Fire

"THE FASTEST-FIRING AUTOMATIC GUN ever mass-produced" is the manufacturer's description of a cannon for jet aircraft. The manufacturer, **Pontiac Division of GMC**, says that the rate of fire of the "Gun, Automatic, 20mm, M39" is "acknowledged to be considerably greater than the firing rate of the latest caliber .50 machine gun, which fires 1200 rounds per minute." Designed by **Army Ordnance**, the gun has been on the drafting boards and in experimental stages for more than five years. In appearance the gun is like a giant revolver without a handgrip. Ammunition is carried into the firing chamber in a revolving cylinder. It is fired electrically and is gas-operated. The revolving cylinder is said to simplify cooling of the gun.



A NEW and efficient tool "layaway" system in which tools for the production of the M48 medium tank are "packaged" and stored in a new **Corps of Engineers** warehouse near the factory has been revealed by the Army and the **Ford Motor Co.** Photograph shows Ford engineers checking storage of tank-producing machinery in the warehouse.

WHILE THE HORROR of the H-bomb created talk of the even more horrible cobalt bomb, "production of radioactive cobalt would be most efficient in the smaller A-bombs," according to **Science News Letter**. However, "it is not likely that a cobalt bomb will ever be test fired, unless we do go absolutely mad," the magazine said. This is because it cannot be aimed and "its radioaction would be wafted upon every breeze and last for generations." The magazine says that "radioactive cobalt isotope 60 is an extremely useful chemical element that will probably do more good than harm" as a source of "gamma rays useful in treating cancer, irradiating industrial products, X-raying materials, etc."

JUNE 1954




ARMY AVIATORS are to receive flight, operational and maintenance familiarization instruction on the **Cessna XL-19B** aircraft and other Cessna planes at the Cessna Wichita plant during the coming year, the Cessna Company recently announced. The XL-19B sometime ago established an international altitude record while powered by a Boeing 502-8 turbo-prop engine.



THIS IS GREAT BRITAIN'S new heavy tank, the **Conqueror**, now in limited production and destined for British units in Germany. Few details are known but it has been officially announced that it is heavier in weight and bigger gunned than any existing British tank. According to reports, electronic controls stabilize the gun vertically and horizontally.

IN COOPERATION with industry the **Corps of Engineers** has produced attachments which are interchangeable among the three most common commercial bulldozers used by the armed forces. The cooperating companies are **Allis-Chalmers**, **Caterpillar** and **International**.





# The Month's Books

History and memoirs (in themselves a form of history) fill our book review columns this month. Leading off with the memoirs of one of our most formidable opponents in Europe in World War II, we jump to Korea five years later with Captain Gugeler's surprisingly frank account of small-unit actions in a "little war," for which we were, as usual, unprepared. General Clark's *From the Danube to the Yalu* bridges both space and time, from Europe to Korea, and from the end of World War II to the truce of 1953.

The Recapture of Guam brings us back to the Pacific in World War II, to an action that was "the beginning of the end of the Japanese Asia dream."

The three reviews that bring up the rear are of books that are not particularly "important," but that cover fields of interest that literate soldiers have always found fascinating.

## Formidable Enemy

### A SOLDIER'S RECORD

By Field Marshal Albert Kesselring  
William Morrow & Co., 1954

381 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. AARON BRADSHAW

This is the intimate story, frankly told, of a distinguished German soldier who kept his sense of balance during many critical years. He was a great soldier who had the character and integrity to be great, both in victory and defeat.

In 1936 Kesselring was made Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe. But he later had disagreements with Milch (Secretary of State and Deputy to Goering in the Ministry). As a result, he asked for and was given a field command. This was a very important step in Kesselring's career as it gave him an opportunity to exercise command and also placed him in a position where he was immediately available to take a large air command when hostilities commenced.

It is particularly interesting to read the Field Marshal's comments with respect to the attitude and the actions of the Russians along the German-Russian border after the Polish campaign. He says the Russian fighters fired on German aircraft; they showed little friendliness even to the point of withholding necessary weather reports. In other words, the Russians have a "form," and they run true to form at all times.

The Field Marshal pays a great deal of attention to an explanation of the bombing of Rotterdam. In his explanation, a failure of certain communications at important moments is brought out. All in all, his story is convincing and if you accept the premise Kesselring was an honorable general, you may accept his statement as being the picture as he saw it.

The Battle of Britain is not given much space in the book. It was a failure and he discusses the various facets of the battle to make it clear that there were reasons for the failure. He points out that Goering initially wanted air warfare banned by international law, and he makes the argu-

ment that the air raids on open cities were first flown by the RAF.

One of the interesting things about Kesselring is that he apparently thinks in terms of all three services, Army, Navy and Air, having in mind the importance of balanced forces and coordinated offensives—something a great many people think about but not many practice.

Throughout the story of the various campaigns, Kesselring mentions that Hitler greatly underrated the importance of the Mediterranean Theater possibilities; in fact, Kesselring often points out the great importance he placed on that area.

The author stresses the great importance of the capture of Malta in order to strangle the Allied line of communications through the Mediterranean. On the other hand, there was Rommel and OKW backers who felt that Egypt was the target. At any rate, Kesselring did put an air attack on Malta which he says was completely successful and that a landing could have been made there on 10 May, and it was a grave mistake not to have made such a landing. In fact, he feels that Italy should have taken Malta at the outset of the war. At the time Kesselring got started in the North African campaign in early 1942, Rommel had just had some success and wanted to go on to Cairo, saying he could make it in ten days.

So Malta was shelved in favor of Cairo. Kesselring feels that was a decisive action.

The Field Marshal's estimate of the situation as given in his book (regardless of what he may have actually estimated it in 1942) is a very fine bit of G-2 work. However, Hitler and his Wehrmacht operation staff (1) never gave sufficient importance to the Mediterranean Theater, and (2) misjudged the objective of the Allies' invasion (North Africa). Kesselring makes two comments that are interesting: he says Montgomery "played for safety," and was methodical; he also says Rommel should have been removed because of the disharmony that existed between Rommel and the Italians.

Kesselring states his strategic objective was to keep Eisenhower's armies separate from Montgomery's. His problems were many and most difficult and even with complete cooperation and resources he would have had a job on his hands. But during this important campaign Kesselring surprisingly enough complains that Rommel was dispirited and his heart was not in the job, and there was a certain pig-headedness on the part of both Rommel (who was opposite Montgomery) and von Arnim (who held the front against Eisenhower).

Once a landing was made at Salerno, Kesselring gave his attention to his withdrawal up the boot with stands at the better topographical lines. At the same time he had to set up an Italian government, and as it finally worked out Kesselring feels it would have been simpler to have fought the war in Italy without any Italian government.

The Field Marshal goes into some detail in discussing the battle along the Cassino line and he rightly concludes that it was a German success. Considering the relative forces involved, he can take much satisfaction in this determined fight by the Germans.

The Field Marshal makes a good case for fighting the battle for Italy. His principal point is that with the battle not fought as it was, the heart of Germany

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

## LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

I am always happy to find that soldiers are often better and more sensitive politicians than those who feel they have a vocation for that profession. It is ironical to record that soldiers, so frequently repudiated, defamed and ridiculed by the whole world, in times of real need are called to leading positions and overwhelmed with honors.

FIELD MARSHAL ALBERT KESSELRING  
*Kesselring: A Soldier's Record*

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

would have been seriously threatened by the capture of the Brenner Pass area.

The Field Marshal's comments on the partisan war in Italy are written quite feelingly. He refers to it as guerrilla warfare and to indicate more clearly its implications he states that their strength was between 200,000 and 300,000 men toward the end of the war. He gives a very good description of the partisan organization and in well-selected words describes the nature of their operations including the professionally trained reconnaissance group at one extreme, and the riffraff of murderers and robbers at the other end.

There is no escaping Kesselring's intention to place part of the blame for what he calls "a violation of all the rules of law" on the Allied high command and on the Italian government of General Badoglio.

The Field Marshal describes in some detail the steps he took and had to take as a commander of a force from the theater of war to protect his men from this guerrilla warfare, and he says, "Unless one wanted to commit suicide, he had to reverse his natural feelings." It would be profitable to military men of countries who may get into civilized war in the future to read his chapter on this very distasteful and critical part of his service.

The transfer of Kesselring to Commander-in-Chief, West, came rather suddenly, having been precipitated by the fall of Remagen. Kesselring's immediate situation was 55 German divisions in various states of depletion opposed to 85 Allied divisions. The Luftwaffe in the west was not under his immediate command, but operated from a high command in the rear. The enemy was not only superior in numbers and matériel but much superior in the air.

OKW must have been in desperate straits because all the additional strength they could turn over to Kesselring was one "full division!" However, Kesselring did not expect any sudden collapse. He apparently was dumbfounded when the Americans crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim, as he had warned his army commander of the possibility of that attempt. This crossing left the way to Frankfurt open and permitted the decisive blow at Aschaffenberg, 27-28 March, to take place. Following that, there was a crossing by the French of the lower Rhine. With the Rhine breached in the north, the center and the south, the story from then on is one of constant reverses. During his attempts to re-form in the midst of such reverses, Kesselring even gave thought to a counterattack on Patton's left flank!

When it came time to surrender, Kesselring's last thoughts were for his troops. He thanked them and asked them to conduct themselves properly.

It is difficult in this short review to try to describe Kesselring's feelings at the final moments of surrender; a most difficult time for his human emotions.

The charges on which Kesselring was tried, the new rules of international law

that were applied *ex post facto*, the lack of attention to the accused's rights or the sentence itself can give little satisfaction to anyone connected therewith. It is a matter that might well be made a study for joint understanding by statesmen and defense officials, for in the future if the men in arms are to be held responsible to the new rules followed in the courts of Nürnberg and some of the other postwar trials, there is only one place for the American soldier to be, and that is on the winning side. Particularly important is the new rule under which a soldier must be responsible for the political orders of his government and must decide when to follow them and when to oppose them! In other words, when does he disobey an order given by his government, and when does he carry it out? Kesselring's discussion of this whole subject of the trials and the legal status of an officer is very well done. Or perhaps all the above may be pure theory, since the Communists follow no civilized rules of war or court trials.

It might be well to close this review with an extract from his closing pages, a statement in regard to himself wherein he walks out at the end of the book with his head held high and a philosophical attitude towards life. "The condemnation by Pharisees cannot touch a man who has or has had some self-respect. My life has been rich because it was filled with work and cares and responsibilities. It was not my doing that it had to end in suffering, but if in this situation I can and may still be something to my comrades, if men of standing are still glad to have a talk with me, this is a great grace."

### Hard Facts of History

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA:  
Infantry, Artillery, Armor  
By Capt. Russell A. Gugeler  
Combat Forces Press; 1954  
272 Pages; Maps; \$5.00

Reviewed by  
MAJ. GEN. J. C. FRY

Here are authentic accounts of conflict that should be read by every professional officer and soldier, for purely career educational purposes. The book is, in addition, a wonderful account of Korean battle action that the average citizen might well read to learn what takes place when ground forces clash. One who knows war can recognize complete authenticity. Here is stark truth, from the degrading pattern of abject cowardice to the superb level of valor where men give their lives proudly and gallantly for God and Country.

Within these pages can be found the basis for appreciation of our soldiers' performance under varying conditions of combat, and of the need to follow sound military procedures.

Too frequently we find evidences in accounts such as this of an inclination to discard sound principles of war and apply untested measures. Soldiers violate doctrines that have been pieced together as a

result of centuries of combat, and payment is made in blood.

In the opening pages we find units engaged in serious field operations with a formidable enemy while under the impression they have a minor, unimportant, police action to deal with. These men and many of their officers have obviously grown soft under occupation days in Japan. They are not conditioned for war, either mentally or physically, and their losses are proof positive of the need to remain eternally vigilant and combat-ready.

Senior generals and lowly privates alike could learn much from a study of these initial paragraphs.

Consider the conduct of Captain Osborn's Company A. It is understandable that it was difficult for all ranks to realize that they were engaged in a desperate war, because information to that effect had not reached them with proper emphasis from command levels above. However, the rout of the organization which panicked and ran a mile to Pyongyang can't be explained so easily. These men lacked discipline, and the chain of command leadership wasn't strong enough to cause them to wait for instructions from their leaders. Outwardly, the picture is one of fear and confusion, but basically the problem has additional deep roots. Twelve men of a platoon consisting of thirty-one men had dirty, broken, or improperly assembled weapons. Thirty per cent of the organization was lost for lack of proper battle indoctrination, strong leadership control, and because basic methods of communication and security were neglected.

The readers of this book should ponder the cost in human life. Some of the men who died in the early days of the conflict are dead because of indirect pressures to educate and entertain soldiers of our occupation forces rather than to train them for their basic mission. Between the lines, one can detect the fact that officers have catered to whims of their men beyond the best interests of their units. The primary mission of the ground soldier is to be able to kill an adversary. This requires mental and physical hardening and units that have learned through hard repetitive training how to mesh fire power, unit coordination, communication and control. The commander who requires high standards of readiness for combat will never have cause to spend a sleepless night because his failures contributed to the death of young soldiers.

Beyond the pattern of individual performance on the battlefield, the book contains factual descriptions of combat procedures that succeeded and of some that failed. Not least in importance are the activities of Air Force, liaison planes, and helicopters. A liaison plane does a superb job of locating the enemy and thus makes a great contribution to the success of one phase of an operation. Another example includes the dropping of food and ammunition which fail to reach friendly hands. A third example includes a napalm air at-



tack on friendly troops, where American soldiers are killed by our own Air Force. And a helicopter is employed to land a corps commander at an advanced battalion headquarters. Reflection on how air and ground efforts were coordinated might well lead to the conclusion that our ground forces need their own air support.

And for senior officers and those that seek such responsibilities, there is also the lesson of evaluation of information. A corps commander lands at an advanced battalion CP and lightly advises the unit not to be stopped by a bunch of laundrymen. Objective evaluation of information at that time might well have indicated greater deliberation and less optimism.

Examples flit across the pages that the man who aspires to battle leadership may well study to advantage. A young officer who is physically tired, mentally jaded, and with heavy heart over the responsibility for his men, is decorated with a Silver Star when he is in desperate need of counsel and assistance. When his senior departs, the decoration is thrown at a snow bank. And one can feel that only strong ties of discipline, courage, and character kept this young officer from weeping. Decorations have their place, but in the heat of battle, life is precious, courage is commonplace, and sound professional judgment and counsel are beyond value. The senior has the burden of justifying the faith of juniors.

The endless lessons of the book include confirmation of our principles of war, our training documents, and battle procedures as spelled out in our field manuals. In every war, there are lessons to be learned, but our training literature shouldn't be rewritten merely because an impractical plan succeeded. The discussion of the Outpost Eerie operation is an example. Here is a piece of ground that would have made a logical outpost for the enemy, but was an impractical position for United Nations troops. The mission of an outpost as spelled out in Field Manual 7-10 is correct, and such positions can be found without isolating units to a degree where they are at the mercy of the enemy. The outpost served no useful purpose. The same results could have been achieved at far less cost by aggressive patrol action. The lesson here is to avoid wasting life through ill-considered, costly tactical decisions.

## Without Victory

FROM THE DANUBE TO THE YALU

By Mark Clark

Harper & Brothers, 1954

396 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

JOHN H. THOMPSON

There have been times in the military history of the United States when command meant frustration for the commander, but it would be difficult to find any example to compare with the Far East command during the Korean war. To Gen. Mark Wayne Clark that war was the war nobody

wanted to win. His predecessors, Generals MacArthur and Ridgway, had had the same frustration, but it also fell to Clark's lot to become the first army commander in our history to sign an armistice without victory when he placed his signature on the document executed at Panmunjom.

Now retired to the presidency of The Citadel after forty years as a professional soldier, General Clark has told the story of "Operation Frustration" during the thirteen months he held the Far East Command. Like his *Calculated Risk*, the memoirs of commanding the Fifth Army and 15th Army Group in Italy in World War II, *From the Danube to the Yalu* is pithy and pungent. It picks up where he left off in Memoir No. One—hammering at the Russians across the Vienna conference table on the Danube in Austria in 1945-47 when he was supreme American commander—and tells the tale of Korea, as he saw it from the viewpoint of a military commander representing this country and the United Nations, and the viewpoint of a soldier-diplomat dealing with the unpredictable Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, the Japanese, the militant Red Chinese and North Koreans, and our British allies. It certainly wasn't a dull life.

Outspoken even to the point of bluntness, Clark makes a number of points certain to keep the military and political hot-stove leagues buzzing for a long while. At no time after he assumed command six months after the war was deadlocked in stalemate and the Chinese had built a deep belt of mountain fortifications, states the general, was victory possible "unless." The "unless" meant accepting totally unacceptable casualties in a drive to the Yalu, or a tremendous build-up of more divisions, sea and air power and no restrictions on bombing China. Washington was not prepared to execute either plan.

But there had been a time for decision, a time for victory. To Clark this was in 1950 when the Red Chinese hurled their legions into the fray, after the North Korean army had been squashed. Had he been the commander then, Clark asserted, he would have "screamed to the high heavens" for authority to bomb Chinese airfields, bases and every installation from which the Chinese derived their source of strength and power. It was inconceivable to him—and he thinks it must have been to MacArthur—that this nation would countenance a situation in which "Chinese soldiers killed American youths in organized formal warfare and yet we would not fail to use the power at our command to protect those Americans." If we had shown determination then, Clark maintains, the chance of Soviet intervention and a third world war would have been far less than Washington feared.

As commander, Clark made a number of recommendations. They included a rapid build-up of the ROK army—which did not come about until it became a cam-

paign issue of the Presidential election—and the use of Nationalist Chinese divisions in Korea. The latter idea died in a pigeonhole. His staff also prepared plans for an offensive to win the war and an estimate of what this would entail, but when General Eisenhower—the President-elect—visited Korea, Clark was never asked for any such estimate by his old boss. Washington wanted an armistice with honor.

Clark was also unwilling to approve any of the proposals for attacks, made by the former Eighth Army commander, Gen. James Van Fleet, believing the casualties were not worth any limited gains, unless ultimate victory were the goal. He made one exception, the action at Snipers Ridge and Triangle Hill which started 14 October 1952. In place of the pre-battle estimate of 200 casualties, the command sustained more than 8,000, mostly Korean.

Nor did he think much of the United Nations contribution to combat. Gallant and able though the UN troops were, says Clark, the total number of men was shamefully "piddling." In his relations with President Rhee, Clark admired the doughty patriot, but waxed caustic over Rhee's intransigence, his efforts to break up the negotiated armistice, an action which cost the UN command 900 casualties a day when the truce had almost been settled.

Outside the main elements of over-all strategical conceptions with which the book is largely concerned, Clark also speaks to the point about other events: the fake landing at Wonsan which scared the enemy command, the unique evacuation of thousands of friendly guerrillas from behind the Chinese lines, the use of Russian pilots in the Chinese air force, the much greater strength of the Chinese army as a result of its battle training at our expense, the time the Japanese tapped his telephone, the failure of air power because of Washington-imposed restrictions, and the Red brain-washing technique imposed on prisoners and against which American soldiers must now be trained.

He has a formula, too, for our foreign policy in Korea. Pull out. Get the Army out now, and never again commit it to battle on a peninsula in a war it isn't allowed to win. Then announce in unmistakable language that any violation of ROK territory will immediately result in our unlimited use of air power, including our atomic bombs. This policy has the virtue, at least, of simplicity. It is the expected one offered by a general whose experience convinces him that world communism understands only one thing: force.

## THE RECAPTURE OF GUAM

By Major O. R. Lodge, USMC

U.S. Government Printing Office

214 Pages; Index; Maps; \$4.25

Reviewed by

BRIG. GEN. EDWIN H. RANDLE

The recapture of Guam was the "I shall return" of the United States Marine Corps.

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

But it was much more than a point of honor. It was the beginning of the end of the Japanese Asia dream. Admiral King had advocated a drive in the Central Pacific with the Marianas as a key objective, but it was General Arnold's support which in the end brought it about. He pointed out that B-29 bases in the Marianas, as compared with China, would simplify supply and save 1,200 miles on the round-trip flight to Japan.

While the fight for Saipan was in progress, intelligence studies indicated more Japanese troops on Guam than hitherto calculated. The operation was therefore postponed until the 77th Infantry Division (Army) could be brought up from Hawaii. One combat team, the 305th, was rushed to Eniwetok and attached to the 1st Provisional Brigade (Marine). The remainder of the 77th arrived a few days later. The new date for the assault was set at 21 July 1944.

The basic plan of III Amphibious Corps (Marine) was simple: (1) capture a beachhead which would pinch off Orote Peninsula by landings north and south of it; (2) capture the peninsula and its airfield; (3) push across and cut the island in half; (4) drive north and exterminate the enemy. The belief that the enemy would fall back to the north turned out to be correct.

South of Orote Peninsula the plan called for the 1st Brigade to swing left and close it off before the high ground 2,500 yards east of the beaches was captured. At Eniwetok it was suggested to General Shepherd, the brigade commander, that one would not dare turn a flank to high ground occupied by German troops. "I know," he said. "But with these bastards you can take chances." And he was right, as it turned out. But students of tactics should recognize this as an exception; that stopping short of high ground held by the enemy, or turning a flank to it, is not always to be recommended. At Okinawa the Japanese made better use of hills and escarpments.

The Japanese were well supplied with light artillery on Guam. Had they massed its fires they could have made the landings and the recapture of the island much more difficult and costly. The artillery was entirely dispersed as single accompanying guns and had little effect.

The recapture went as planned in spite of all efforts of the Japanese, rough terrain (much of it jungle) and an almost total absence of roads. At one time two divisions were supplied over a single narrow road. A fine cooperative spirit within both units insured the success of this unique sharing of a main supply route.

Relations between the Marines and the 77th Infantry Division were excellent throughout the operation. When the 305th Combat Team was ordered ashore the first night, the Marine command was somewhat less than generous in furnishing them no LVTs to negotiate the reefs. But the 77th



## Pass In Review

Among the books received this month is one that is likely to appeal to large numbers of our readers if past reading tastes are a guide: *Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase* (\$6.50). Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury kept an intimate and detailed diary which David Donald of Columbia University has edited with consummate skill. In addition to the fascinating descriptions of Cabinet meetings, the preparation and discussion of the Emancipation Proclamation and the character sketches of important military and political leaders of the era, there are completely frank accounts of Northern politics during the Civil War period. Lincoln considered Chase to be one of the best public servants he knew and certainly this insight into the man, which is available for the first time, adds greatly to his stature.

Another Lincoln book that came out this month is *The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators* (\$7.50). This is a facsimile edition, reproduced photographically, of the original testimony taken down in the courtroom by Benn Pitman during the trial held in May and June, 1865.

For our travelogue this month, we should mention two books. The first of these should be of great interest to all who have served or are about to pull a tour of duty in the European Theater. It's called *Europe: A Journey With Pictures* (\$7.50). Here we have a romantic tour of western Europe in text and pictures. There are over 270 pictures; the photography and reproduction are superb. This is not primarily a tourist guide but would serve more usefully as a treasured album of lovely villages, towns and cities; fabulous buildings and art treasures; and breathtaking scenery. It is a beautiful book.

Our other travel book takes us to the incredibly wild regions of the Northern Territory of Australia. Alan Moorehead has lent his unusual talents to this description of *Rum Jungle* (\$3.50). Moorehead was born in Australia and this is an account of his rediscovery of this wilderness country still inhabited by the aborigine and the koala bear. Here is a completely fascinating book that sneaks up on you and you find yourself still engrossed long after the light should have been turned off.

For the home handyman there are two new books of interest. The first, *How to Use Portable Power Tools* (\$2.95), reflects the tremendous growth in sales of these tools to home owners. In picture and text, Maurice Reid gives a full course in the proper use of power-driven drills, saws, sanders, planers, routers and shapers. He includes chapters on safety and tool maintenance as well as useful appendices on the characteristics of common woods, board measure chart, the decimal equivalents of wire, letter and fractional-size drills, drill and bit sizes, an abrasive chart for sanders, and recommended extension cord sizes for use with portable equipment. The second book in this field is a paper-backed *Home Repairs and Improvements* (\$1.50). As the title indicates, this book is a how-to-do-it concerned with repair and redecoration of the home, refinishing furniture, and the use of wood, plaster, brick and concrete in these operations.

Graduates of the USMA will be interested in a new book called *The Black Knights of West Point* (\$10.00). Here in yearbook format is the complete history of the exploits of the brave old Army football teams since 1890. Many team and individual pictures combined with short summaries of key games make this about as complete a record as is apt to be put together.

Our own Combat Forces Press will be making two notable contributions to the field of military literature this month. If you read last month's JOURNAL carefully you saw a chapter from one of these books: *Combat Actions in Korea* (\$5.00). This book was written by Capt. Russell Gugeler of the Office of the Chief of Military History. It is filled with detailed accounts of small-unit combat actions and we think it's a highly interesting and very valuable book for all soldiers.

The second book which will roll from our presses this month is *The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division* (\$6.50). This history of "Old Ironsides" in World War II has been years in preparation and the time has been well spent. As the publishers of the great majority of World War II division and unit histories we have a good yardstick for comparison. This book will rank with the best of them.

—R.F.C.

was determined to pull its weight in this, its first operation, and did. During the fighting the soldiers were pleased to be called, with some affection and admiration, "the 77th Marines."

While the enemy on Guam was outnumbered, outgunned and outclassed, his determination to die fighting for his Emperor, as always, made for a rugged and desperate fight. Major Lodge has had access to Japanese documents and interviews, all of which lend much interest and give a clearer picture of the enemy's plans, hopes, and circumstances.

The first chapter gives a concise background of the island and its seizure by the Japanese in 1941. Succeeding chapters detail the decision to return, planning and preparation, the landings and drive to the beachheads, as well as the deadly fight for Orote Peninsula. Chapter V is devoted to supporting elements: naval gunfire, air, artillery, engineer, shore-party, medical, and even war dogs. The last two chapters carefully describe the sustained fight to the north to exterminate the enemy and clear the island of all resistance. A great deal of information of value to the historian, and to participants, is contained in the appendices.

Major Lodge and the Historical Branch of the Marine Corps have prepared an excellent account of the entire Guam operation. The volume is profusely illustrated and strikingly bound. The twenty large color maps in the back are excellent. As a tactical study of an amphibious landing followed by a sustained attack it is well worth the time of any serious military student.

## Moment of Truth

**THE BOOK OF FAMOUS ESCAPES**  
By Eric Williams  
W. W. Norton & Co., 1954  
453 Pages; \$4.95

Reviewed by  
RICHARD G. McCLOSKEY

To no one does the grass in the other pasture look greener than to a prisoner. A bee line to the other pasture seldom runs over two hundred feet. The problem is to cover that distance without being seen or heard. The stories of how that problem has been solved are among the most fascinating and exciting stories ever told. Eric Williams, whose *Wooden Horse* is one of the most fabulous of escape stories, has gathered eighteen first-hand accounts of flight from captivity.

This book is no mere anthology, though, no cut-and-paste job. Each escaper has during his struggle what the bullfighter calls the *moment of truth*. It is the moment when one says to oneself, "This is me, this is it." In that moment of truth the escaper "knows that he is alone, and that his self-respect, his reputation and his life depend on the coolness and skill that he can command in the next few seconds." Williams has chosen that portion of each escape story that recounts the moment of truth. That is

the thread that holds these diverse narratives together. In addition, Williams has provided an introduction containing an expert analysis of the psychology and tactics of escape, and a commentary to each narrative that sets the stage for the moment of truth.

With the exception of the first two accounts, John Gerard's escape from the Tower of London in 1597 and Casanova's scramble across the rooftops of Venice in 1756, the accounts are all of military break-outs. Williams provides three from the Napoleonic wars (two English and one French); one of a Yankee lieutenant's escape from the "Hotel de Libby" during the Civil War; two from the Boer War; three from World War I (one each out of Germany, Libya, and Turkey); and seven during World War II. Of these seven, one tells of an American escape from Italy, and the others of Englishmen escaping from Germany, Greece, Poland, Malaya, and Italy.

So much for the statistics. The narratives themselves are rich in the humor and fortitude of great adventure, and peopled with frightened heroes—malcontents who pitted themselves against fantastic odds. It's a humdinger of a book.

## Subtle Deceit

**THE MAN WHO NEVER WAS**  
By Ewen Montagu  
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1954  
160 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.75

Reviewed by  
ORVILLE C. SHIREY

Publication of this book was made possible largely by chance—and a fortunate chance it was for the military student and lay reader alike. *The Man Who Never Was* is the story of the ruse that convinced the German high command that Sicily would not be the next operation after North Africa, that the Allied armies then in North Africa were going to split to invade Sardinia and Greece. The author is the man who conceived the deception and supervised its execution.

The "man" in the title is a corpse whose identity we shall never learn. This body is provided with the identity of a fictitious Major William Martin of the Royal Marines, down to the last detail of his personal life. He is also provided with a briefcase containing "background" letters of the sort high officers occasionally write to each other out of channels, one of them most indiscreet. He is carrying these letters to the addressee incidental to another mission. He is also provided with a Mae West to indicate that he has died in an air crash off the Spanish coast. The body is then taken by submarine to a point off that coast where it is as certain as wind and tide can make it that it will be found, and cast adrift there.

As intended, the letters are well studied by the German intelligence service through the courtesy of their "neutral" Spanish con-

tacts before they are returned to England through diplomatic channels. German documents captured in 1945 and reproduced in this book show beyond any doubt that the ruse was a complete success—that the German intelligence service, the high command, and Hitler himself swallowed the story whole, thereby saving many Allied lives in the course of the Sicilian operation.

In addition to being one of the most fascinating yarns to come out of World War II, this book has a very practical value. Few officers, of course, will ever have an opportunity to conceive and put into effect a ruse on so high a level. But the book shows very clearly the forethought, the planning and the painstaking care that must go into an operation of this kind. It should also be a clear warning to the inevitable amateur G-2s of our own and other armies, including those who make up stories to tell if they should be taken prisoner, that deceiving the enemy is a difficult science and had best be left to the experts. A ruse, even at a very low level, can do incalculable damage if it backfires.

## "The Great"

**CHARLEMAGNE: The Legend and the Man**  
By Harold Lamb  
Doubleday & Co., 1954  
320 Pages; Index; \$4.50

Reviewed by  
COL. R. ERNEST DUPUY

Every few hundreds of years there is born into this hodgepodge world of ours an individual whose stature, by the time of his exit—and sometimes even before—has loomed so high above his contemporaries that popular opinion, history, folklore or what have you, has pinned forever to his name the suffix of "Great." Pontiffs, conquerors, emperors, kings—and a few queens, too—have received this accolade, from Cyrus down to Napoleon. But to only one of this distinguished clan, so far as this reviewer can recall, has the suffix become indissolubly part of his name.

There has been but one Charlemagne.

His impact upon the Western world was, as Lamb writes, "... like the flash of a lighthouse beacon through the murk of Europe, and it did not appear again until the crusades."

Out of that Middle Ages murk, and despite the paucity of authentic records, the historians have given us a pretty fair idea of what Charlemagne accomplished, not only as a conqueror but, more important, as an administrator and an educator. He was the catalyzing agent resolving a chaotic jumble of races and tribes into the component parts of the Europe of today—from the Atlantic to the Elbe and Danube, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean.

Harold Lamb has proven, time and time again, an ability and an artistry which transport the reader into the past, presenting not only the actors, but also the spirit moving them. His protagonists are no puppets; they live and move and think



their problems out before the reader's eyes; that is his spell.

In this book he has done it again. He carries us along with the gangling, ignorant son of Pepin and grandson of Charles Martel, from the first awakening of his inquisitive spirit to the culmination, when Pope Leo III placed the Imperial crown upon the head of the man who tried, and almost succeeded, in making a dream come true—the dream of a Christian world living in peace.

All this and more Mr. Lamb unfolds in his usual entertaining style. Sugar-coated history it is, if you will, but nevertheless history and romance baked to a turn in the fashion all Lamb fans enjoy. It's too bad we can't get more of this sort of history.

And, for those of us who during World

War II trod the face of Europe, there is added interest in recalling that where American troops went, Charlemagne had already been. Names like Aix, Prüm, Paderborn, Fulda and Fritzlar; Monte Cassino, Rome and Marseilles; Thionville, Cologne, Mainz and Worms, all take on new meaning.

**TRAITOROUS HERO: The Life and Fortunes of Benedict Arnold**  
By William M. Wallace  
Harper & Brothers, 1954  
394 Pages; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by  
ORVILLE C. SHIREY

Benedict Arnold remains America's most notorious traitor. But we have concentrated

so much on Arnold the traitor that we have forgotten his military accomplishments.

Mr. Wallace has given us a sharply written, soundly researched study of one of the most fascinating scoundrels in American history and has done much to resolve the apparent contradiction between Arnold the hero and Arnold the traitor. Interestingly enough, Arnold is an extreme example of the officer who is a brilliant battle leader but lacks the depth of character and moral toughness to withstand the boredom and routine—and often the discouragement—of military life out of combat. Mr. Wallace gives no possible solution to the problem—and there may very well be no solution to it—but *Traitorous Hero* provides endless possibilities for speculation on the subject.

## A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

*This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.*

**THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS.** Compiled by Benn Pitman, with an introduction by Philip Van Doren Stern. Funk and Wagnalls, 1954. 422 Pages; Illustrated; \$7.50. A facsimile edition of the original Pitman report of the trial which has been out of print for nearly seventy-five years.

**FROM FLINTLOCK TO M1.** By Joseph W. Shields, Jr. Coward-McCann, Inc., 1954. 220 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$7.50. Text and illustrations of the development of the rifle in America.

**CHALLENGE IN EASTERN EUROPE.** Edited by C. E. Black. Rutgers University Press, 1954. 276 Pages; Index; \$4.00. Expert personal knowledge of seven Iron Curtain countries.

**THE CHISHOLM TRAIL.** By Wayne Gard. The University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. 296 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.50. A stirring history of the cattle route to Abilene.

**DECISION IN KOREA: An Authentic History of the Korean War.** By Rutherford M. Poats. The McBride Company, 1954. 340 Pages; Index; \$4.75. One of the first one-volume histories of the war in Korea, written from the eyewitness vantage of a United Press correspondent. The author served in the Infantry during World War II.

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